(续上)「他的话」是说只有言语、尚无行动;即使如此,贤者也能解这誓愿。
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……「他的话」,就是说,还没有任何行动,只有言语;即使如此,贤者也能解这誓愿。
That is to say that there was not yet any action but only speech, and even so the halakhic authority can dissolve the vow.
← 许愿卷总目·第十一章 这些誓愿
这不是译本,是辅读层。中文承载文本本身,并逐句标出哪些是塔木德自己的话、 哪些是 施泰因扎尔茨 补入的解释,以及哪些地方翻译必然有所流失。
谢法利亚 的 威廉·戴维森 版用 <b> 标出塔木德原文,其余为
施泰因扎尔茨 补入。下面的比例是逐句从这个标记算出来的,不是判断。
这一面每读 32 句,只有一句以塔木德自己的话为主。把这件事藏起来, 读者会以为自己读的是塔木德;标出来,他才知道自己站在哪里。
(续上)「他的话」是说只有言语、尚无行动;即使如此,贤者也能解这誓愿。
……「他的话」,就是说,还没有任何行动,只有言语;即使如此,贤者也能解这誓愿。
That is to say that there was not yet any action but only speech, and even so the halakhic authority can dissolve the vow.
革玛拉以前引的巴拉伊塔反驳这一版本:人许愿不从某人受益,又许愿不从将为他解愿的人受益,须先解第一个;若众人都认为未生效也能解,何必讲次序?
革玛拉从前引的 《巴拉伊塔》 对这个争论版本提出反驳:人若说:「某人的东西对我是 愿禁 ,我不从他受益;我向谁求解这个誓愿,从那人受益对我也是 愿禁 」,那么他若要解这两个誓愿,必须先就第一个誓愿求解,然后才可就第二个求解。
The Gemara raises an objection against this version of the tannaitic dispute from the aforementioned baraita: If one says: The property of so-and-so is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, and deriving benefit from he who I will request dissolution for the vow is also konam for me, if he desires to dissolve the vows he must first request dissolution with regard to the first vow, and afterward he can request dissolution with regard to the second.
可是照上面所说,众人都同意誓愿未生效以前也能解,为什么要这样?
But according to what was stated above, that all agree that a vow can be dissolved even before it has taken effect, why is this so?
他若愿意,可以先就这个誓愿求解;若愿意,也可以先就那个誓愿求解。
If he so wishes, he can first request dissolution with regard to this vow, and if he wishes, he can first request dissolution with regard to that one.
革玛拉答:巴拉伊塔没有说明哪个在先、哪个在后;他也许尽可先解那个禁止他从贤者受益的誓愿。
革玛拉答:他哪里知道哪个是第一个、哪个是第二个?
The Gemara answers: Does he know which vow is first and which is the second?
这则 《巴拉伊塔》 的措辞在这一点上并不清楚。
The wording of the baraita is not at all clear on this point.
他若愿意,也许可以先就那个禁止他从将为他解愿的贤者受益的誓愿求解。
Perhaps, if he so wishes, he can first request dissolution of the vow not to derive benefit from the halakhic authority from whom he will request dissolution of his vow.
革玛拉又以第二则巴拉伊塔反驳:须先解受益之愿,再解以求解为条件的拿细耳人之愿;不说可任选次序,可见誓愿须先生效才能解。这一版本被确凿驳倒。
革玛拉又从上面引的第二则 《巴拉伊塔》 提出反驳:人若说:「某人的东西对我是 愿禁 ,我不从他受益;我一旦为这个誓愿求解,我便是拿细耳人」,那么他若要解这两个誓愿,必须先就那个禁止他从某人受益的誓愿求解,然后才可就他所许的拿细耳人之愿求解——这个愿是他以求解第一个誓愿为条件而许下的。
The Gemara raises a further objection from the second baraita cited above: If one says: The property of so-and-so is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, and I am hereby a nazirite for when I will request dissolution of this vow, if he desires to dissolve the vows he must first request dissolution with regard to his vow that rendered benefit from a particular person forbidden, and afterward he can request dissolution with regard to his vow of naziriteship that he accepted upon himself should he request dissolution of his first vow.
可是他为什么必须这样做?
But why must he proceed in this manner?
他若愿意,可以先就不从那人受益的誓愿求解;若愿意,也可以先就拿细耳人之愿求解。
If he so wishes he can first request dissolution with regard to his vow not to derive benefit from that other person, and if he wishes he can first request dissolution with regard to his vow of naziriteship.
这则 《巴拉伊塔》 没有这样说,可见誓愿必须先生效,才能解除。
The fact that the baraita does not say this indicates that a vow can be dissolved only once it has gone into effect.
革玛拉断定:这是对 拉比拿单 与众贤争论这一版本的确凿驳斥。
The Gemara concludes: Here is a conclusive refutation of this version of the dispute between Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis.
密释纳:起初贤者们说,有三种妇人即使丈夫不愿也要被休,却仍可领取婚书的款项:自称「我对你已成不洁」的祭司之妻;说「天在我与你之间」的妇人;许愿「我与犹太人隔绝」的妇人。
起初贤者们说:有三种妇人,即使丈夫不愿也要被休,却仍可领取婚书所定的款项。
Initially the Sages would say that three women are divorced even against their husbands’ will, and nevertheless they receive payment of what is due to them according to their marriage contract.
第一种是祭司的妻子对丈夫说「我对你已成不洁」,即她声称遭了强暴,因此如今对丈夫已成禁忌。
The first is the wife of a priest who says to her husband: I am defiled to you, i.e., she claims that she had been raped, so that she is now forbidden to her husband.
第二种是妇人对丈夫说「天在我与你之间」,即她声称丈夫无能行房;这说法她无法证明,因为真相只有神知道。
The second is a woman who says to her husband: Heaven is between me and you, i.e., she declares that he is impotent, a claim she cannot prove, as the truth of it is known only to God.
第三种是妇人许愿说「我与犹太人隔绝」,即与任何犹太人同房之乐,连丈夫在内,都禁于她。
And the third is a woman who takes a vow, stating: I am removed from the Jews, i.e., benefit from sexual intercourse with any Jew, including my husband, is forbidden to me.
后来贤者们为免妇人看上别人、借此离开丈夫,改订为:祭司之妻须为遭强暴拿出证据;说天在我与你之间的,法庭只以请求处理;许愿与犹太人隔绝的,丈夫废止他那一份,她可与他同房,对其余犹太人仍是隔绝。
后来他们改口说:为免已婚妇人看上别的男人,为此破坏与丈夫的关系,还带着婚书的款项离去,这几条 哈拉哈 便作了如下修改:对丈夫说「我对你已成不洁」的祭司之妻,必须为她遭强暴的说法拿出证据。
They subsequently retracted their words and said that in order that a married woman should not cast her eyes on another man and to that end ruin her relationship with her husband and still receive payment of her marriage contract, these halakhot were modified as follows: A priest’s wife who says to her husband: I am defiled to you, must bring proof for her words that she was raped.
说「天在我与你之间」的妇人,法庭要以请求的方式处理此事,不强迫丈夫休妻。
As for a woman who says: Heaven is between me and you, the court must act and deal with the matter by way of a request, rather than force the husband to divorce his wife.
至于说「我与犹太人隔绝」的妇人,丈夫须废止他那一份,即誓愿中关乎他的部分,使她对他得许可,她便可与他同房;但她对其余所有犹太人仍是隔绝的,所以他若休了她,她便对所有人都是禁忌。
And with regard to a woman who says: I am removed from the Jews, her husband must nullify his part, i.e., the aspect of the vow that concerns him, so that she should be permitted to him, and she may engage in sexual intercourse with him, but she is removed from all other Jews, so that if he divorces her she is forbidden to all.
疑问:祭司之妻对丈夫说「我对你已成不洁」,可否吃举祭?拉夫舍舍特说可以,免得给儿子们招来坏名声;拉瓦说不可,她尽可吃俗物。
众贤提出一个疑问,是根据密释纳的第二条裁决:祭司的妻子若对丈夫说「我对你已成不洁」,她可否吃 举祭 ,这 哈拉哈 如何?
A dilemma was raised before the Sages, based on the second ruling of the mishna: If the wife of a priest said to her husband: I am defiled to you, what is the halakha with regard to whether she may partake of teruma?
是她既然在休妻一事上不被采信,在 举祭 上也不被采信呢?还是在 举祭 上她被采信,因此禁止她吃 举祭 ,如同祭司之妻与丈夫以外的男人同房时的 哈拉哈 那样?
Is the halakha that just as she is not believed with regard to divorce, so she is not believed with regard to teruma, or is the halakha that with regard to teruma she is believed, and therefore it is prohibited for her to partake of teruma, as is the halakha of a woman married to a priest who engages in sexual intercourse with a man other than her husband?
拉夫舍舍特 说:她可以吃 举祭 ,免得她给儿子们招来坏名声。
Rav Sheshet said: She may partake of teruma, so that she not cast aspersions on her children.
她若被禁吃 举祭 ,人们就会以为这证实了她遭强暴的说法,便会传出谣言,说她的儿子们不配任祭司职。
If she is barred from partaking of teruma, people will see this as supporting her claim that she had been raped, and rumors will circulate that her sons are unfit for the priesthood.
拉瓦 说:她不可吃 举祭 ,因为她可以吃俗物;最好还是顾及她自称不再可吃 举祭 的说法。
Rava said: She may not partake of teruma, as she can partake of non-sacred food, and it is preferable that her claim that she is no longer permitted to eat teruma be taken into account.
拉瓦说:拉夫舍舍特也承认,她若守寡就不可再吃举祭;因为他的理由只是免得儿子们蒙坏名声,她守寡或被休后,人们会说她是现在才遭强暴的。
拉瓦 说: 拉夫舍舍特 也承认:这位自称遭强暴的祭司之妻,后来若丈夫死了,她守了寡,就不可再吃 举祭 。
Rava said: And Rav Sheshet concedes that if this wife of the priest who claimed to have been raped was then widowed from him, she may not continue to partake of teruma.
为什么?
Why?
允许她吃 举祭 ,理由岂不只是免得她给儿子们招来坏名声吗?
Isn’t the reason that she is permitted to partake of teruma only that she should not cast aspersions on her children?
既然如此,她若守寡或被休,人们会说:她是现在才遭强暴的,即整件事发生在她不再是他妻子以后。
This being the case, if she was widowed or divorced, people will say that only now it occurred that she was raped, i.e., the entire incident occurred after she was no longer married to her husband.
所以不会传出谣言,说她先前给他生的儿女不合格。
Therefore, rumors will not circulate that the children that she bore him beforehand are unfit.
拉夫帕帕说:拉瓦考我们:祭司之妻遭强暴,可否领取婚书的款项?对祭司而言强暴等同情愿,她或许无权领取;或许她可以说:我仍适合留在婚姻里……(下接叶九十一正)
拉夫帕帕 说: 拉瓦 用下面的问题考我们:祭司之妻若当着证人遭了强暴,她有权领取婚书的款项,还是无权领取?
§ Rav Pappa said: Rava tested us with the following question: As for the wife of a priest who was raped in the presence of witnesses, is she entitled to receive payment of her marriage contract or is she not entitled to receive payment of her marriage contract?
革玛拉解释问题的两面:是否这样定 哈拉哈 :既然对祭司而言,强暴等同于对以色列人而言的情愿同房——祭司之妻遭强暴就必须离开丈夫,正如以色列人之妻情愿与别的男人同房就必须离开丈夫——所以她无权领取婚书的款项?
The Gemara explains the two sides of the question: Is the halakha that since rape with regard to a woman married to a priest is like willing sexual intercourse with regard to a woman married to an Israelite, as the wife of a priest who was raped is obligated to leave her husband, just as the wife of an Israelite who willingly engaged in sexual intercourse with another man is obligated to leave her husband, she is therefore not entitled to receive payment of her marriage contract?
还是她可以对他说:我仍然适合留在婚姻里,因为丈夫若是以色列人,我遭强暴后对他并不禁忌……
Or perhaps she can say to him: I am fit to continue being married, as, if her husband were an Israelite she would not be forbidden to him after being raped.
「我仍然适合」原文 אֲנָא הָא חֲזֵינָא,字面作「我还是合格的」。