革玛拉从 拉比梅伊尔 与 拉比约西 的争论求解:说「这是燔祭的替换,平安祭的替换」,前者认为只算燔祭的替换;后者认为他若本意如此,既不能一口同时说出两个名目,他的话就都有效。同理,人也可以有意既确立又废止。
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革玛拉答:从 拉比梅伊尔 与 拉比约西 的争论来听这个疑问的解答,如我们在一条密释纳(《更换卷》叶二十五背)所学:人指着一头牲畜说:这就是燔祭的替换,平安祭的替换,哈拉哈 是它只成为燔祭的替换;这是 拉比梅伊尔 的话,他认为人起初的话起决定作用。
The Gemara answers: Come and hear a resolution of this dilemma from the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei, as we learned in a mishna (Temura 25b): If one said about an animal: This is hereby a substitute for a burnt-offering, a substitute for a peace-offering, the halakha is that it becomes a substitute only for a burnt-offering; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir, who holds that one’s initial statement is determinant.
「替换」指以俗畜替换已献作祭的牲畜,见利未记 27:10,原文 תְּמוּרָה。
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拉比约西 说:他若从一开始就是这个意思,要它既作燔祭的替换,又作平安祭的替换,那么,既然不能一口同时给它两个名目,他也不可能同时说出燔祭和平安祭,他的话就有效,这头牲畜同时作两者的替换。
And Rabbi Yosei says: If this is what he intended from the outset, that it should be a substitute for both a burnt-offering and a peace-offering, then since it is impossible to give it two names at once and he could not have said burnt-offering and peace-offering simultaneously, his statement is effective, and the animal is a substitute for both of them at once.
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同样,他也可以有意既确立又废止这个誓愿,于是誓愿就废除了,虽然他起初的话是确立。
Similarly, it is possible for him to intend to both ratify and nullify the vow and the vow is nullified, despite the fact that his first statement was to ratify it.