(续上)这就确切驳倒了 拉夫犹大 的意见。
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……这就确切驳倒了 拉夫犹大 的意见。
And this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Yehuda.
上接叶十五正第十二段。
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这不是译本,是辅读层。中文承载文本本身,并逐句标出哪些是塔木德自己的话、 哪些是 施泰因扎尔茨 补入的解释,以及哪些地方翻译必然有所流失。
谢法利亚 的 威廉·戴维森 版用 <b> 标出塔木德原文,其余为
施泰因扎尔茨 补入。下面的比例是逐句从这个标记算出来的,不是判断。
这一面每读 12 句,只有一句以塔木德自己的话为主。把这件事藏起来, 读者会以为自己读的是塔木德;标出来,他才知道自己站在哪里。
(续上)这就确切驳倒了 拉夫犹大 的意见。
……这就确切驳倒了 拉夫犹大 的意见。
And this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Yehuda.
上接叶十五正第十二段。
革玛拉答:密释纳并不是说她去之前按理就可以从他得益,而是说她若事后已得了益,就犯了「不可食言」。
革玛拉答:密释纳这样教,并不是说她去之前按理就可以从他得益。
The Gemara answers: When the mishna teaches this, it does not mean that before she went she was permitted to derive benefit from him ab initio.
而是说,她若事后已从他得益,就犯了「不可食言」的禁令。
Rather, it means that if she derived benefit from him after the fact, she is in violation of: He shall not profane his word.
再引后面的密释纳:丈夫说「你从我得益直到住棚节都是 愿禁,如果你在逾越节以前回父亲家的话」,她若逾越节前去了,直到住棚节都被禁从他得益,逾越节后可以回父亲家。
我们在后面(叶五十七背)学到:丈夫若对妻子说:「你从我得益,直到 住棚节 为止,都是 愿禁,如果你在逾越节以前回你父亲家的话」,那么她若在逾越节前去了,直到 住棚节 为止都被禁从他得益,因为誓愿已生效;而她在逾越节之后可以回父亲家。
We learn further on (57b) that if the husband said to his wife: Deriving benefit from me until the festival of Sukkot is konam for you if you go to your father’s house until Passover, then, if she went before Passover, she is prohibited from deriving benefit from him until the festival of Sukkot, as the vow took effect, and she is permitted to go to her father’s house after Passover.
革玛拉推论:她只有逾越节前去了才被禁,没去就可以从他得益,不担心她日后回父亲家——这与 拉夫犹大 的意见相抵。
革玛拉推论:只有她在逾越节前去了,才被禁从他得益。
The Gemara infers: Only if she went before Passover is it prohibited for her to derive benefit from him.
她若没去,就不被禁从他得益。
However, if she did not go it is not prohibited for her to do so.
她可以从他得益,不必担心她之后会回父亲家而违犯禁令。
She may derive benefit from him, and there is no concern that she will subsequently go to her father’s house, transgressing the prohibition.
这与 拉夫犹大 的意见相抵,他认为条件一旦成就就会使所做之事回溯成为违愿的,人就不可去做。
This is difficult according to the opinion of Rav Yehuda that one may not perform an action that will be rendered retroactively a violation of a vow if the condition is met.
拉瓦 答:其实她没去也被禁从他得益;分别只在于去了的得益要受鞭打,没去的只是被禁,免得她在逾越节前回父亲家而违愿。
拉瓦 说:其实也是一样,她即使没去,也被禁从他得益。
Rava said: The same is true, that even if she did not go, she is prohibited from deriving benefit from him.
分别在于:她若去了,不但被禁从他得益,她若得益还要受鞭打;她若没去,只是被禁从他得益,免得她在逾越节前回父亲家而违愿。
The difference is that if she went it is not only prohibited for her to derive benefit from him, but if she does so she is flogged; whereas if she did not go, it is merely prohibited for her to derive benefit from him, lest she violate the vow by going to her father’s house before Passover.
革玛拉引一则 《巴拉伊塔》 驳 拉夫犹大:人说「这饼今天对我被禁,如果我明天去某处的话」,他若吃了,就受「不可去」约束;可见他今天可以吃。
革玛拉对 拉夫犹大 的意见提出异议:一则 《巴拉伊塔》 教:人若说:「这个饼今天对我被禁,如果我明天去某某地方的话」,那么他今天若吃了这饼,就受「不可去」的禁令约束,即明天不可去。
The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rav Yehuda: It is taught in a baraita that if one said: This loaf is forbidden to me today if I go to such and such a place tomorrow, then if he ate the loaf today, he is subject to the prohibition that he shall not go tomorrow.
可见他今天可以吃,不必担心他明天会去。
Apparently, he may eat it today, as there is no concern that he will go tomorrow.
革玛拉答:这则 《巴拉伊塔》 并没有教他按理可以吃,只教「他吃了」,即一旦吃了,就受「不可去」约束。
革玛拉答:矛盾何在?
The Gemara answers: Where is the contradiction?
这则 《巴拉伊塔》 难道教的是他按理可以吃这饼吗?
Does the baraita teach that he may eat the loaf ab initio?
它只教「他吃了」,即他一旦吃了,就受「不可去」的禁令约束。
It teaches only that he ate, i.e., that once he ate, he is subject to the prohibition that he shall not go.
「他吃了」原文 אָכַל,与「他吃」אוֹכֵל 相对。
《巴拉伊塔》 又教:他若第二天去了,就犯「不可食言」;只说「去了」,可见按理不可去,却可以吃饼使自己不可去——这合于 拉夫纳赫曼,而对 拉夫犹大 是个难题。
这则 《巴拉伊塔》 又教:他若第二天去了,就犯了「不可食言」的禁令。
It is further taught in the baraita: If he went the next day, he is in violation of: He shall not profane his word.
革玛拉推论:这则 《巴拉伊塔》 只说他事后已去的情形,可见他按理不可去。
The Gemara infers from the fact that the baraita is referring only to a case in which he went after the fact, that he may not go ab initio.
「去了」原文 הָלַךְ,与「他去」מְהַלֵּךְ 相对。
这表明他可以吃这饼,借此使自己第二天不可去。
This indicates that he is permitted to eat the loaf, thereby prohibiting himself from going the next day.
这与 拉夫纳赫曼 的意见相符,即人可以借着实现条件使誓愿生效;而对 拉夫犹大 的意见是个难题。
This accords with the opinion of Rav Naḥman that one may cause a vow to take effect by fulfilling its condition, and it poses a difficulty to the opinion of Rav Yehuda.
革玛拉答:拉夫犹大 可以说,后一款本也可以教「他去」;只因第一款依他只能教「吃了」,后一款也就照样教「去了」,以求笔法一致。两说都没有被驳倒。
革玛拉答:拉夫犹大 可以对你说:其实也一样,这则 《巴拉伊塔》 本可以教「他去」。
The Gemara answers: Rav Yehuda could have said to you that the same is true, that the baraita could have taught that he may go.
但第一款既然教的是他事后已吃了饼的 哈拉哈——照 拉夫犹大,第一款不能教「他吃」,因为他认为人按理不可吃——后一款也就教他去了的 哈拉哈,而不教「他去」,以保持笔法一致。
However, since the first clause teaches the halakha where he ate the loaf after the fact, as it cannot teach that he may eat it according to Rav Yehuda, who holds that it is prohibited for him to eat it ab initio, the latter clause also teaches the halakha in the case where he went, and does not teach that he may go, to maintain a uniform style.
总之,两种意见都没有被驳倒。
In conclusion, neither opinion is refuted.
密释纳说「我与你同房是 愿禁」违犯者犯「不可食言」;革玛拉问:依妥拉之律丈夫有义务与妻子同房,「好合的事,仍不可减少」,他怎能以愿禁止?
密释纳教:人对妻子说「我与你同房,对我是 愿禁」,他若违犯这誓愿,就犯了「不可食言」的禁令。
§ It is taught in the mishna that with regard to one who says to his wife: Engaging in sexual intercourse with you is konam for me, if he violates the vow he is in violation of the prohibition: He shall not profane his word.
革玛拉问:人怎能使与妻子同房成为被禁之事?
The Gemara asks: How can one render prohibited engaging in sexual intercourse with his wife?
依妥拉之律,他不是有义务与她同房吗?因为经上写着:「那女子的吃食、衣服,并好合的事,仍不可减少」(出埃及记 21:10)。
But isn’t he duty bound by Torah law to engage in sexual intercourse with her, as it is written: “Her food, her clothing, and her conjugal rights he may not diminish” (Exodus 21:10)?
革玛拉答:照所引措辞,誓愿不生效;密释纳说的是「我从与你同房所得的快乐对我被禁」,他没有义务享受这快乐,所以能以誓愿禁止同房。
革玛拉答:誓愿若照所引的措辞,并不生效。
The Gemara answers: The vow does not take effect if it is formulated as cited.
密释纳说的是他说「我从与你同房所得的快乐对我被禁」的情形,同房因此不合他的意。
Rather, the mishna is referring to a case where he says: The pleasure I derive from engaging in sexual intercourse with you is forbidden to me, and sexual intercourse is therefore not amenable to him.
他既没有义务去享受与她同房所得的快乐,就能禁止自己享受这快乐。
Since he is not obligated to experience the pleasure he derives from sexual intercourse with her, he can prohibit himself from experiencing this pleasure.
他用这种方式,就能借誓愿使他们同房成为被禁之事。
In this manner he can render their sexual intercourse forbidden by means of a vow.
拉夫卡哈纳 说:妻子许愿「与我同房对你被禁」,法庭强制她同房,因为她对丈夫负有义务;她若许愿「我从与你同房所得的快乐对我被禁」,就不可同房,因为不可把对人被禁之物喂给他。
正如 拉夫卡哈纳 所说:妇人若许愿说「与我同房对你被禁」,法庭强制她与他同房,因为她因丈夫的同房之权而有义务与他同房。
As Rav Kahana said: If a woman vows: Sexual intercourse with me is forbidden to you, the court coerces her to engage in sexual intercourse with him, as she is duty bound to engage in sexual intercourse with him due to his conjugal rights.
但她若许愿说「我从与你同房所得的快乐对我被禁」,他们就不可同房,因为她从同房中得快乐,而人不可把对他被禁之物喂给他吃。
However, if she vows: The pleasure I derive from engaging in sexual intercourse with you is forbidden to me, it is prohibited for them to engage in sexual intercourse, as she derives pleasure from the sexual intercourse and one may not feed a person that which is forbidden to him.
密释纳:起誓不睡、不说话、不行走的,这些事对他被禁。说「供物,我不吃你的」「这供物,我要吃你的」「我不吃你的,不是供物」,食物仍许可。
人若说:「我起誓不睡」,或「我起誓不说话」,或「我起誓不行走」,这些事对他就被禁。
If one says: I take an oath that I will not sleep, or: That I will not speak, or: That I will not walk, this activity is prohibited to him.
如前所教(叶十正),许愿的主要方式之一是提及供物。
As taught earlier (10a), one of the primary methods of taking a vow is by invoking an offering.
这条密释纳举出几个例子,说明提及「供物」一词并不生效。
The mishna provides several examples where invoking the term korban is not effective.
人若说:「供物,我不吃你的」,或「这供物,我要吃你的」,或「我不吃你的,不是供物」,那食物仍是许可的。
If one says: An offering [korban] that I will not eat of yours, or: This offering [ha korban] that I will eat of yours, or: That which I will not eat of yours is not an offering [la korban], the food is permitted.
三句原文依次为 קׇרְבָּן לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ、הָא קׇרְבָּן שֶׁאוֹכַל לָךְ、לֹא קׇרְבָּן לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ。