拉夫舍舍特 讲作「于食物无心、于器皿有意」,拉夫阿施 驳曰 《巴拉伊塔》 明说「连器皿也有责」,两下当是一样;他另讲作两下都无心、却先后各自省悟,正合上文 拉比约哈难 与 雷什·拉基什 之争。
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——他于那食物是无心的,于那器皿却是有意的。
one acted unwittingly with regard to the food and intentionally with regard to the vessel.
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他要为那食物献赎罪祭,为那器皿受 剪除 之罚。
He is liable to bring a sin-offering for the food and to receive karet for the vessel.
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拉夫阿施 极力驳这个讲法。
Rav Ashi strongly objects to this.
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那条 《巴拉伊塔》 岂不是教说「他连那器皿也有责」么?
Didn’t the baraita teach: He is liable even for the vessel?
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可见为食物所担的责与为器皿所担的责本是一样的。
Apparently, the liability for the food and the liability for the vessel are identical.
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倒不如说,拉夫阿施 说:所论的是他于这一样——食物——与那一样——器皿——都出于无心的情形。
Rather, Rav Ashi said: This is referring to a case where one acted unwittingly both with regard to this, the food, and with regard to that, the vessel.
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他先省悟了一样过犯,随后又省悟了另一样。
And he became aware of one transgression, and then he became aware of the other transgression.
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如此断法,正系于上文 拉比约哈难 与 拉比西缅·本·拉基什 所争的那一层:人无心之下把同一样过犯犯了两次、又各自先后省悟的,要不要献两个赎罪祭。
And the ruling is dependent upon the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish cited above, with regard to the question whether or not one who unwittingly performed a single transgression twice and became aware of each separately is liable to bring two sin-offerings.