(续上)拉夫阿施 的反驳:若记载的是相反情形——妇人吩咐「收下」,代理人却对丈夫说她吩咐「带来」,而裁定是休书一到代理人手中即生效——那才可推知丈夫凭妻子之言。
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若记载的是相反的情形,那倒可以理解:妇人说的是:替我收下我的 休书 ,代理人却对丈夫说:你妻子说了,把我的休书带来给我;丈夫说:拿去,照她所说的;而 拉夫纳赫曼 转述 拉巴·巴尔·阿武赫 所引 拉夫 的话说:休书一到代理人手中,她就被休了。
Granted, if the opposite was stated, i.e., a case where the woman said: Receive my bill of divorce for me, and the agent said to the husband: Your wife said: Bring me my bill of divorce, and the husband said: Here you are, as she said, and Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says that Rav says: Once the bill of divorce reaches the agent’s possession, she is divorced, it would be understandable.
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由此显然可知,丈夫是凭妻子的话,以为这代理人是代收的代理人;他有意给代理人的,是妻子所定的身份,而不是代理人声称她所定的身份。
Apparently, the husband relies upon her statement that the agent is an agent of receipt, and he intended to give the agent the status the wife assigned, not the one the agent says she assigned.