(续上)问题的另一面:要从已抵押的产业中追偿,是否只要债务数额固定即可,即使没有写下来?
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还是说,要从已抵押的产业中追偿,只要这项义务的数额是固定的就够了,即使它没有写下来?
Or perhaps, in order to collect from liened property, it suffices that the obligation be of a fixed amount, even if it is not written?
← 休书卷总目·第五章 受损害的
这不是译本,是辅读层。中文承载文本本身,并逐句标出哪些是塔木德自己的话、 哪些是 施泰因扎尔茨 补入的解释,以及哪些地方翻译必然有所流失。
谢法利亚 的 威廉·戴维森 版用 <b> 标出塔木德原文,其余为
施泰因扎尔茨 补入。下面的比例是逐句从这个标记算出来的,不是判断。
这一面每读 21 句,只有一句以塔木德自己的话为主。把这件事藏起来, 读者会以为自己读的是塔木德;标出来,他才知道自己站在哪里。
(续上)问题的另一面:要从已抵押的产业中追偿,是否只要债务数额固定即可,即使没有写下来?
还是说,要从已抵押的产业中追偿,只要这项义务的数额是固定的就够了,即使它没有写下来?
Or perhaps, in order to collect from liened property, it suffices that the obligation be of a fixed amount, even if it is not written?
革玛拉引一宗案子来解答:某人死后留下两个女儿和一个儿子,长女先取了产业的十分之一作嫁资,次女未及收取,儿子就死了;全部产业落到两个女儿手里,二人如何分产有争议。
革玛拉提议:来听,从曾经说过的话里可以解答这个问题,因为众 阿摩拉 对下面这件事有争议:有一个人死了,留下两个女儿和一个儿子;长女抢先取了产业的十分之一作她的嫁资——因为儿子们有义务供养亡父的女儿,直到她们成年或订婚,并要从父亲的产业中给她们一份作嫁资,有儿子在时女儿不继承;但次女还没来得及收取她那十分之一的嫁资,儿子就死了。
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear an answer to this question from what was stated, that the amora’im disagree about the following issue: There is a case of one who died and left two daughters and a son, and the first daughter went ahead and took one-tenth of the estate as her dowry, as sons are obligated to sustain their deceased father’s daughters until they reach majority or become betrothed and to give them part of his estate as a dowry, as daughters do not inherit when there are sons; but the second daughter did not manage to collect her tenth of the estate for her dowry before the son died.
于是全部产业落到两个女儿手里,由她们二人平分;而她们该如何分这份产业,有争议。
Therefore, the entire estate fell to the two daughters, who then divide it between themselves, and there is a dispute as to how they divide the estate.
拉比约哈难说次女已放弃了她那十分之一;拉比哈尼纳反驳:贤者们说过嫁资可以从买主那里追取,生活费却不可以;产业既为嫁资所抵押,次女岂能算放弃?
拉比约哈难 说:次女已放弃了她那十分之一的产业,因此她不能要求像她姐姐那样先取产业的十分之一作嫁资,然后两人才平分剩下的产业。
Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The second daughter forfeited her one-tenth of the estate, and therefore she cannot demand that she should first receive one-tenth of the estate as her dowry, as did her sister, and that only afterward they divide what remains of the estate equally between themselves.
拉比哈尼纳 对他说:他们不是说过比这更进一步的话吗?若兄弟卖掉了父亲遗产中的产业,女儿的嫁资可以从买主那里追取,她的生活费却不能从买主那里追取。
And Rabbi Ḥanina said to him: Did they not say even more than this, that if the brother sold off property belonging to his father’s estate, payment for the daughter’s dowry can be appropriated from the buyer, but payment for her sustenance cannot be appropriated from him?
既然父亲的产业为女儿的嫁资所抵押,她甚至能从向儿子买了产业的第三方那里收取嫁资,那么在姐妹分产之前,她理应能从父亲的产业中收取嫁资。
If the father’s estate is liened to his daughter’s dowry, so that she can collect her dowry even from a third party who bought the property from the son, she should be able to collect it from her father’s estate before it is divided up between the daughters.
而你却说次女已放弃了她那十分之一?
And you say that the second daughter forfeited her one-tenth of the estate?
革玛拉据此推论:嫁资数额固定(十分之一)却没有写下,照拉比哈尼纳仍可从已卖出的抵押产业中追取。
革玛拉试图就先前提出的问题得出结论:拉比哈尼纳 所说的嫁资,即孤女从父亲产业中应得的嫁资,不是数额固定——产业的十分之一——而没有写下来的吗?
The Gemara tries to draw a conclusion with regard to the question that was raised previously: But isn’t the dowry mentioned by Rabbi Ḥanina, i.e., the dowry to which an orphan daughter is entitled from her father’s estate, of a fixed amount, i.e., one-tenth of the estate, and it is not written?
然而照 拉比哈尼纳 的说法,它仍可以从已卖给别人的已抵押的产业中追取。
And nevertheless, according to Rabbi Ḥanina, it can be appropriated from liened property that has been sold to another party.
革玛拉驳回:嫁资不同,因为它有风声,人人知道死者的产业须为女儿的嫁资留出一份,所以如同写下的一样;别的情形照拉比哈尼纳或许仍须既固定又写下。
革玛拉驳回这个论证:嫁资不同,因为它有风声。
The Gemara rejects this argument: A dowry is different, since it generates publicity.
一个人死后若留下女儿,人人都知道他的产业中有一份是为她们的嫁资抵押的。
If one dies and is survived by daughters, everyone knows that a portion of his estate is pledged for their dowries.
因此这项义务被视为如同写下来的一样。
Therefore, the obligation is considered to be as if it were written.
在别的情形下,照 拉比哈尼纳 的说法,或许仍须这项义务既数额固定又写下来。
In other situations, it might be necessary according to Rabbi Ḥanina that the obligation be both of a fixed amount and written.
拉夫胡纳·巴尔·玛挪亚引《婚书卷》的密释纳反驳:妇人与先后两任丈夫约定供养她前夫所生的女儿;两夫死后,他们自己的女儿只从无负担的产业中受供养。
拉夫胡纳·巴尔·玛挪亚 从一条密释纳(《婚书卷》叶一百零一背)提出反驳,那条密释纳讲的是:一个妇人嫁给一个男人,与他约定由他供养她前一段婚姻所生的女儿。
Rav Huna bar Manoaḥ raised an objection from a mishna (Ketubot 101b) that addresses the case of a woman who was married to a man with whom she had stipulated that he would sustain her daughter from a previous marriage.
她被他休了以后,又嫁给另一个男人,与他作了同样的约定,于是这个继女从两任丈夫那里都得生活费。
After receiving a divorce from him, she married a different man with whom she made the same stipulation, so that the stepdaughter receives sustenance from the two husbands.
那条密释纳说:若两任丈夫都死了,他们自己的女儿——即使是同一个妇人所生的——只从他们遗产中无负担的产业受供养。
That mishna states: If the husbands died, then their own daughters, even from that same woman, are sustained only from the unsold property in their estate.
这与上面那条密释纳(本卷叶四十八背)所教的 哈拉哈 一致。
This accords with the halakha taught in the mishna above (48b).
(续上)那条密释纳又说:继女却连已卖出的已抵押的产业也可追取生活费,因为她如同债主。她的生活费既不固定也没写下,对两种说法都是难题。
《婚书卷》的那条密释纳接着说:但继女即使从已卖给第三方的已抵押的产业中也受供养。
The mishna in Ketubot continues: But the stepdaughter is sustained even from liened property that had been sold to a third party.
这是因为她的法律地位如同债主,所以她有权从原属继父——她的债务人——的产业中收取她的债。
This is due to the fact that her legal status is like that of a creditor, and therefore she has the right to collect her debt from property formerly owned by her stepfather, her debtor.
这对两种说法都是难题,因为继女的生活费从已卖给别人的已抵押的产业中追取,尽管它既不是固定的数额,也没有写下来。
This is difficult according to both opinions, as the stepdaughter’s sustenance is appropriated from liened property that has been sold to another person, despite it being neither a fixed amount nor written.
革玛拉答:这里讲的是母亲从丈夫手中以取得行为确认了这项约定,因此如同写下并公开,两任丈夫的产业都为继女的生活费所抵押。
革玛拉回答:我们在这里讲的是什么情形?
The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here?
我们讲的是母亲从他手中取得了供养女儿的权利,就是说,他们行了一项取得行为来确认这项约定。
We are dealing with a case where the mother acquired the right to the daughter’s sustenance from his possession, i.e., where they performed an act of acquisition confirming the stipulation.
因此这就当作约定已经写下并公开了,于是两任丈夫的产业都为继女的生活费所抵押。
Consequently, it is considered as though the stipulation had been written and publicized, and so the property of the two husbands is liened for the stepdaughter’s sustenance.
革玛拉问:若是行了取得行为,死者自己的女儿也该能从已卖出的产业中追取生活费。答:母亲只为继女取得了这项权利,没有为其他女儿取得。
革玛拉问:若是这样,即那条密释纳讲的是行了取得行为的情形,那么死者自己的女儿也应当有权从已卖给第三方的已抵押的产业中收取生活费。
The Gemara asks: If that is so, that the mishna is referring to a case where they performed an act acquisition, then the deceased’s own daughters as well should be entitled to collect their sustenance from liened property that has been sold to a third party.
革玛拉驳回这个论证:那条密释纳讲的是母亲为这一个——继女——取得了受供养的权利,却没有为另外那些女儿取得。
The Gemara rejects this argument: The mishna is referring to a case where the mother acquired the right to sustenance on behalf of this one, the stepdaughter, but did not acquire the right to sustenance on behalf of the other daughters.
革玛拉问:坦拿凭什么断定是为继女取得而不为亲女取得?答:继女在取得行为时已在世,取得对她有效;亲女当时尚未出生,取得对她无效。
革玛拉问:那位 坦拿 把这条 哈拉哈 定在母亲为这一个取得、却不为那一个取得的情形上,是什么缘故?
The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the decision of the tanna to record the halakha in a case where the mother acquired the right for this one but not for that one?
革玛拉解释:他妻子前一段婚姻所生的女儿,在取得行为时——就是他把婚书交给母亲时——已经在世,取得行为对她有效。
The Gemara explains: With regard to his wife’s daughter from her previous marriage, who was alive at the time of the act of acquisition, i.e., when he gave the mother her marriage contract, the act of acquisition is effective for her.
他与这位母亲所生的亲生女儿,在取得行为时尚未在世,取得行为对她无效。
With regard to his own daughter from this mother, who was not alive at the time of the act of acquisition, the act of acquisition is not effective for her.
革玛拉反驳:难道不也包括两个女儿在取得行为时都已在世的情形吗?例如他休了她又复娶,复娶时才行取得;那时亲女已在世,取得为何对她无效?
革玛拉提出异议:我们这里不是也在讲两个女儿在取得行为时都已在世的情形吗?
The Gemara raises an objection: Are we not dealing here even with a case where both of them were alive at the time of the act of acquisition?
那是什么情形?
And what are the circumstances?
就是她嫁给他、为他生了一个女儿以后,他把她休了,后来又复娶她,复娶时行了取得行为,确认供养的约定。
It is a case where after she was married to him and had a daughter from him, he divorced her and later remarried her, at which time an act of acquisition was performed to confirm the stipulation with regard to sustenance.
既然他的亲生女儿当时已经在世,取得行为为什么不像对继女那样,对亲生女儿的生活费也有效?
As his own daughter was alive at the time, why is the act of acquisition not effective for his own daughter’s sustenance as it is for that of his stepdaughter?
革玛拉改说:亲女是凭法庭定规受供养的,取得行为对她无效;继女不是凭法庭定规受供养,而是凭夫妻明确的约定,取得行为对她有效,可从已卖出的产业中追取。
其实,两者的区别是这样的:他的亲生女儿是凭法庭定规吃——就是受供养——他的产业的,因为女儿从父亲产业受供养的权利是她母亲婚书不可分割的一部分;所行的取得行为对她无效,因为她的权利来自另一个源头,就是法庭定规。
Rather, the difference between them is as follows: With regard to his own daughter, who eats, i.e., is sustained, from his estate based on a stipulation of the court, as the daughter’s right to sustenance from her father’s estate is an inseparable part of her mother’s marriage contract, the act of acquisition that was performed is not effective for her, because her entitlement is derived from a different source, the stipulation of the court.
他妻子的女儿不是凭法庭定规吃他的产业,因为她的权利是基于丈夫与妻子之间明确订立的约定;取得行为对她有效,使她即使从已卖给第三方的已抵押的产业中也能收取生活费。
With regard to his wife’s daughter, who eats from his estate not based on a stipulation of the court, as her entitlement is based on the explicit stipulation made between the husband and the wife, the act of acquisition is effective for her and enables her to collect her sustenance even from liened property that has been sold to a third party.
革玛拉质疑:兼有法庭定规与取得行为的权利,难道反倒不如单凭取得的?于是改说:亲女凭法庭定规受供养,或许父亲生前已给了她钱,有此疑虑便不能从已抵押的产业追取;继女则无此顾虑。
革玛拉质疑这个解释:一项以两个源头——法庭定规与取得行为——为根据的权利,难道反倒不如只以取得行为为根据的权利吗?
The Gemara challenges this explanation: But is a right that is rooted in two sources, both a stipulation of the court and an act of acquisition, inferior to a right that is rooted in an act of acquisition alone?
取得行为是在法庭定规之外加上的,对她理应也有效。
The act of acquisition is in addition to the stipulation of the court, and should be effective for her as well.
其实,两者的区别是这样的:就他的亲生女儿而言,既然她是凭法庭定规吃他的产业的,可以说他或许生前已经把供养她的钱交给了她。
Rather, this is the difference between them: With regard to his own daughter, since his daughter eats from his estate based on a stipulation of the court, say that perhaps he already gave her money during his lifetime for her sustenance.
原文作「他把包裹交给了她」,指钱袋。
既然有这份疑虑,即使行过取得行为确认约定,她也不能从已抵押的产业中追回生活费。
Since there is uncertainty, she cannot recover her sustenance from liened property, even if an act of acquisition was performed to confirm the stipulation.
就继女而言,并没有他或许生前已把钱交给她的顾虑。
With regard to the stepdaughter, there is no concern that perhaps he already gave her the money while he was alive.
因此,若行过取得行为,她即使从已卖给别人的已抵押的产业中也能收取生活费。
Therefore, if an act of acquisition was performed, she can collect her sustenance even from liened property that has been sold to another.
革玛拉再引拉比拿单的话:抢夺田地者卖田后,买主改良了田地,原主收回田地;买主只能从抢夺者无负担的产业中追回改良增值,这是指第二个买主买地在第一个买主改良之前。
革玛拉继续讨论从已卖给第三方的已抵押的产业中追偿的问题:来听 拉比拿单 所说的:若有人强占一块田并把它卖了,买主耕作改良了这块田,后来被强占田地的原主把产业收回,我们说买主只能从抢夺者手中无负担的产业追回他改良田地所增的价值,而不能从已卖给别人的已抵押的产业中追回——这话是在什么时候说的?
The Gemara continues its discussion with regard to collection from liened property that has been sold to a third party: Come and hear what Rabbi Natan said: When do we say that if one appropriated a field and sold it, and the buyer worked the land and enhanced it, and then the initial owner from whom the field had been appropriated reclaimed the property, the buyer can recover the increase in value of the field resulting from his enhancements only from unsold property in the robber’s possession but not from liened property that has been sold to another party?
这是指第二个买主——就是买了确实属于抢夺者的那份产业的人——购买在先,第一个买主对他从抢夺者那里买来的被强占产业所作的改良在后。
This is said when the purchase of the second buyer, i.e., the party who purchased the property that rightfully belonged to the robber, preceded the enhancements made by the first buyer to the appropriated property he purchased from the robber.
(续上)若改良在第二个买主购买之前,便可从已抵押的产业中追回。可见不能追回的原因只在改良不在先,而不在增值数额不固定或未写下。
但若第一个买主的改良在第二个买主购买之前,他即使从已卖给第二个买主的已抵押的产业中也能收取他改良田地所增的价值。
But if the enhancements made by the first buyer preceded the acquisition of the second buyer, then he can collect the increase in value of the field resulting from his enhancements even from liened property that has been sold to the second buyer.
看来,他之所以不能从已抵押的产业中收取增值,是因为改良不在另一块田出售之前,而不是因为增值的数额不固定或没有写在契据上。
Apparently, he cannot collect the increase in value from liened property because the enhancements did not precede the sale of the other field, not because the increase in value is not of a fixed amount or written in a deed.
革玛拉答:此事是坦拿之间的争议。一段巴拉伊塔说:出产的享用、土地的增值、妻女的生活费,都不从已抵押的产业中追取,为了世道安宁,因为这些都没有写下。
革玛拉回答:从这段 《巴拉伊塔》 无法作出定论,因为这是众 坦拿 之间的争议,如另一段 《巴拉伊塔》 所教:法庭不为享用的出产、土地的增值、一个人妻子和女儿的生活费,而从已卖给第三方的已抵押的产业中追取款项。
The Gemara answers: Proof cannot be brought one way or the other from this baraita, since the issue is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in another baraita: The court does not appropriate payment from liened property that has been sold to a third party for the consumption of produce or for the enhanced value of land or for the sustenance of a man’s wife and daughters.
这些债不能从已抵押的产业中收取,理由是为了世道安宁,因为这些义务都没有写在任何契据上。
The reason why one cannot collect these debts from liened property is for the betterment of the world, because all these obligations are not written in any deed.
若买主要冒失去所买土地的风险,去偿付卖主未曾写下的债,他们便无从自保,就没有人肯买地了。
If purchasers are at risk of losing the land they purchased to pay debts of the seller that had not been written, they will have no way to protect themselves, and no one will purchase land.
(续上)拉比约西说:说这是为了世道安宁,因为债未写下,有什么意思?真正的理由是这些义务数额不固定。可见此事在坦拿之间有争议。
那段 《巴拉伊塔》 接着说:拉比约西 说:说土地之所以不被追取只是因为债没有写下,这里面有什么世道安宁可言?
The baraita continues: Rabbi Yosei said: And what betterment of the world is there in this, in stating that the reason the land is not appropriated is only because the debt was not written?
真正的理由不是这些义务数额不固定,所以不能从已抵押的产业中收取吗?
But isn’t the real reason that these obligations cannot be collected from liened property is that they are not of a fixed amount?
土地若为一笔没有上限的债所抵押,就没有人肯买了。
No one would be willing to purchase land if the land were liened to an unlimited debt.
在这段 《巴拉伊塔》 里显然可见,从已卖给第三方的已抵押的产业中追偿的条件,是坦拿时代的一项争议。
It is clear in this baraita that the criteria for collection from liened property that has been sold to a third party are subject to a tannaitic dispute.
密释纳说拾得物归还者不必起誓,也是为了世道安宁。拉比以撒说:失主说「你拾到我两个系在一起的钱袋」,拾者说只拾到一个,拾者须起誓;若说的是两头系在一起的牛,拾者说只有一头,则不必起誓。
密释纳教导:贤者们又定下:拾到失物并归还原主的人,不必起誓说他没有为自己留下失物的任何一部分。
§ The mishna teaches: And it was further instituted that one who finds a lost item and returns it to its rightful owner is not required to take an oath that he did not keep any part of the lost item for himself.
这项定规也是为了世道安宁而定的。
This ordinance was also instituted for the betterment of the world.
拉比以撒 说:若失物的主人向拾者提出主张说:「你拾到了我的两个系在一起的钱袋。」而那人说:「我只拾到一个。」那么拾者须起誓,与任何承认部分主张的人一样。
Rabbi Yitzḥak says: If the owner of the lost item brings a claim against the finder, saying: You found two money pouches tied together that belong to me, and the other person says: I found only one pouch, then the finder takes an oath, similar to anyone who admits to part of a claim.
若主人主张说:「你拾到了我的两头系在一起的牛。」而那人说:「只有一头。」拾者就不必起誓。
If the owner claims: You found two oxen tied together that belong to me, and the other person says: There was only one ox, the finder is not required to take an oath.
革玛拉解释两案的分别:牛会彼此挣脱,可能失落时是两头,后来分开了,拾者只拾到一头;钱袋不会彼此脱开,拾者既承认拾到一个,想必两个都拾到了。
革玛拉解释:这两个案子有分别,是什么缘故?
The Gemara explains: What is the reason for the difference between the two cases?
因为牛会彼此挣脱开。
It is that oxen become detached from each other.
所以可能失落时是两头系在一起的牛,后来分开了,拾者只拾到了一头。
Consequently, it is possible that when the oxen were lost, there had been two that were tied together, but afterward they became separated and the finder found only one.
钱袋却不会彼此脱开。
By contrast, pouches do not become detached from each other.
既然拾者承认拾到了其中一个,按理他其实两个都拾到了。
Since the finder admits that he found one of them, it stands to reason that he actually found both of them.
拉比以撒又说:失主说「你拾到了两头系在一起的牛」,拾者说「我拾到了,已还你一头」,拾者须起誓。
拉比以撒 又说:若失物的主人对拾者说:「你拾到了两头系在一起的牛。」而那人说:「我拾到了两头牛,但已经还了你其中一头。」那么拾者须起誓。
Rabbi Yitzḥak also says: If the owner of the lost item says to the finder: You found two tied oxen, and the other person says: I found two oxen, but I already returned one of them to you, then the finder takes an oath.
革玛拉对拉比以撒的裁决提出疑问:难道他不接受密释纳所说拾得失物者不必起誓、为了世道安宁的规定吗?(下接叶五十一背)
对 拉比以撒 的这些裁决可以提出疑问:难道他不接受密释纳所说的 哈拉哈,即拾到失物的人不必起誓,这是为了世道安宁而定的规定吗?
A question may be raised against these rulings of Rabbi Yitzḥak: But does Rabbi Yitzḥak not accept the halakha stated in the mishna that one who finds a lost item is not required to take an oath, this being an enactment instituted for the betterment of the world?