(续上)既然只能是说了两遍「今天」,那么前引之说便是对 拉夫胡纳 的定论式驳斥。
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这就成了对 拉夫胡纳 之说的定论式驳斥。
and this is a conclusive refutation of the statement of Rav Huna.
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这不是译本,是辅读层。中文承载文本本身,并逐句标出哪些是塔木德自己的话、 哪些是 施泰因扎尔茨 补入的解释,以及哪些地方翻译必然有所流失。
谢法利亚 的 威廉·戴维森 版用 <b> 标出塔木德原文,其余为
施泰因扎尔茨 补入。下面的比例是逐句从这个标记算出来的,不是判断。
这一面每读 8 句,只有一句以塔木德自己的话为主。把这件事藏起来, 读者会以为自己读的是塔木德;标出来,他才知道自己站在哪里。
(续上)既然只能是说了两遍「今天」,那么前引之说便是对 拉夫胡纳 的定论式驳斥。
这就成了对 拉夫胡纳 之说的定论式驳斥。
and this is a conclusive refutation of the statement of Rav Huna.
革玛拉答:其实那是说了「今天」又说「明天」,所谓第二期算给他,是除去多出的那一天;或者他是一次同时承当了两期拿细耳人的誓愿。
革玛拉答:不,其实那是他说「我今天就是拿细耳人,我明天也是拿细耳人」的情形。
The Gemara answers: No, actually the case is where he said: I am hereby a nazirite today, I am hereby a nazirite tomorrow.
注:原文 הֲרֵינִי נָזִיר הַיּוֹם, הֲרֵינִי לְמָחָר,第二句省去「拿细耳人」一词,今补出。
那么所谓「第二期拿细耳人的誓愿顶替第一期算给他」,是什么意思呢?
And what is the meaning of the statement: The second term of naziriteship is counted for him instead of the first?
是说除了多出的那一天之外都算给他,那一天他仍须再守。
It is counted except for that additional day, which he still must observe.
或者,那是他一次同时承当两期拿细耳人誓愿的情形,就是说,他说的是:「我要作两期拿细耳人。」
Alternatively, it may be a case where he accepted upon himself two periods of naziriteship simultaneously, i.e., he said: I am hereby a nazirite twice.
所以第一期的誓愿一经解除,他已守的日子便全数算入第二期。
Therefore, when the vow with regard to the first term of naziriteship is dissolved, the days he observed count entirely for his second term.
拉夫哈姆努纳 另引一则 《巴拉伊塔》 驳 拉夫胡纳:经上「拿细耳人的愿,要离俗」一语重叠,表明拿细耳愿可加在先前的拿细耳愿上,起誓不能叠加,却不能由此由轻推重得出相反之论。
拉夫哈姆努纳 又从一则 《巴拉伊塔》 提出反驳,驳 拉夫胡纳 的意见。
Rav Hamnuna raised an additional objection against the opinion of Rav Huna from a baraita.
经上说:「拿细耳人的愿,要离俗」(民数记 6:2)。
It is stated in the verse: “A nazirite, to consecrate [nazir lehazzir]” (Numbers 6:2).
注:希伯来原文 נָזִיר לְהַזִּיר,「拿细耳」与「离俗」同出一个字根,故说字眼重叠。和合本全句为「无论男女许了特别的愿,就是拿细耳人的愿,要离俗归耶和华」。
从这节经文在此用了相近而重叠的字眼,可推知拿细耳人的誓愿能加在先前的拿细耳人誓愿之上而生效。
From the use of similar, repetitive wording in the verse here it is derived that naziriteship takes effect upon a prior vow of naziriteship.
因为人本可能以为,可由轻推重推出拿细耳人的誓愿不生效,理由如下:起誓较严,尚且不能加在先前的起誓之上而生效;拿细耳人的誓愿较宽,在已有拿细耳人誓愿生效之处,岂不更是不生效吗?
As one might have thought that it could be derived through an a fortiori inference that naziriteship does not take effect, as follows: And just as with regard to an oath, which is more stringent, an oath does not take effect upon a prior oath, with regard to naziriteship, which is more lenient, all the more so is it not clear that it does not take effect where a vow of naziriteship was already in effect?
注:起誓「较严」、拿细耳人的誓愿「较宽」,此处只是 《巴拉伊塔》 立论的前提,革玛拉下文另行追问起誓严在何处。
所以经上说:「拿细耳人的愿,要离俗。」由此推知,拿细耳人的誓愿能加在先前的拿细耳人誓愿之上而生效。
Therefore, the verse states: “Nazir lehazzir.” From here it is derived that naziriteship takes effect upon a prior vow of naziriteship.
革玛拉推敲这则 《巴拉伊塔》 的情形:若是「今天」又「明天」,生效是显然的,何须经文;可见说的是两遍「今天」,而第二个拿细耳愿照样生效,与 拉夫胡纳 之说相反。
是什么情形呢?
What are the circumstances?
若说是人说了「我今天就是拿细耳人,我明天也是拿细耳人」的情形,这还需要经文来证明它生效吗?
If we say it is a case where one said: I am hereby a nazirite today, I am hereby a nazirite tomorrow, does that case require proof from a verse that it takes effect?
第二个拿细耳人誓愿至少在多出的那一天上生效,这是显而易见的。
It is obvious that the second vow of naziriteship takes effect at least on the additional day.
而拿细耳人的期限最短是三十天,所以他还须另守三十天。
And as the minimum term of naziriteship is thirty days, an additional thirty days must be observed.
莫非不是人说了「我今天就是拿细耳人,我今天就是拿细耳人」的情形吗?
Rather, is it not a case where one said: I am a nazirite today, I am a nazirite today?
而这则 《巴拉伊塔》 教导,在这情形下拿细耳人的誓愿同样能加在先前的拿细耳人誓愿之上而生效,与 拉夫胡纳 的意见相反。
And the baraita teaches that in this case as well, naziriteship takes effect upon a prior vow of naziriteship, contrary to the opinion of Rav Huna.
革玛拉答:这则 《巴拉伊塔》 说的是一次同时承当两期拿细耳愿的情形。
革玛拉答:并非如此。
The Gemara answers: That is not the case.
其实,我们这里讨论的是什么情形呢?
Rather, with what are we dealing here?
讨论的是他一次同时承当两期拿细耳人誓愿的情形。
We are dealing with a case where he accepted upon himself two terms of naziriteship simultaneously.
这则 《巴拉伊塔》 教导的是,他须守两期拿细耳人的誓愿,并为每一期各献一份祭。
The baraita teaches that he must observe two terms of naziriteship and bring a separate offering for each.
革玛拉追问 《巴拉伊塔》 所说起誓比誓愿严,严在何处:不在能加于无实质之事,因誓愿也能加于诫命;而在经上就起誓说「不以他为无罪」。
这则 《巴拉伊塔》 说,起誓比誓愿严。
The baraita stated that an oath is more stringent than a vow.
革玛拉问:起誓与誓愿——例如拿细耳人的誓愿——相比,严在何处?
The Gemara asks: And what is the stringency of an oath vis-à-vis a vow, such as a vow of naziriteship?
若说 《巴拉伊塔》 立此说,是因为起誓与誓愿不同,连对没有实质的事物也能生效;那么可以反驳说,誓愿比起誓也有严的一面:誓愿与起誓不同,加在诫命上也能生效,正如加在许可之事上一样。
If we say the baraita posits this because an oath, unlike a vow, takes effect even with regard to a matter that has no actual substance, there is a counterargument that a vow also has stringency vis-à-vis an oath, in that it, unlike an oath, takes effect with regard to a mitzva just as it does with regard to a matter that is permitted.
注:「没有实质的事物」如起誓不睡觉之类,誓愿须系于实物,起誓则否;起誓不能加在诫命上(起誓不守诫命无效),誓愿禁物则可禁及诫命所需之物。
其实,起誓较严,是因为经上就起誓写着:「妄称耶和华名的,耶和华必不以他为无罪」(出埃及记 20:7)。
Rather, oaths are more stringent because it is written with regard to an oath: “The Lord will not hold guiltless he who takes His name in vain” (Exodus 20:6).
注:英译标作 20:6,和合本在 20:7。
密释纳说重复起誓不吃而吃了,只担一次罪责。拉瓦 由「只担一次罪责」而非「只算一个」推知:第二个起誓只是没有生效的余地,第一个一经解除,它便生效。
密释纳教导:人若说:「我起誓不吃,我起誓不吃」,后来吃了,他只须为一次违犯起誓献祭。
§ It is taught in the mishna that if one said: I hereby take an oath that I will not eat, I hereby take an oath that I will not eat, and he then ate, he is liable to bring an offering for only one violation of an oath.
拉瓦 说:他若就第一个起誓向贤者请求解除,并获解除,第二个起誓就对他生效。
Rava said: If he requested and received dissolution from a halakhic authority for the first oath, the second oath takes effect upon him.
这从何得知?
From where is this derived?
从密释纳没有教「只算一个」——就是说,两个起誓相同,如同他只起了一次誓——便可得知。
From the fact that it is not taught in the mishna that there is only one, i.e., it is as though he took only one oath as the oaths are identical.
密释纳教的却是「他只须担一次罪责」。
Rather, it is taught that he is liable for only one.
可见他不为第二个起誓担罪责,只是因为它没有生效的余地,因为他已起誓不吃了。
Evidently, he is not liable for the second oath only because it does not have a span of time in which to take effect, as he is already under oath not to eat.
注:「余地」原文 רַוְוחָא,字面是「空隙、宽处」。
但他就另一个起誓,即第一个起誓,请求解除之后,第二个起誓便有了生效的余地,于是生效。
However, when he requests dissolution of the other oath, i.e. the first oath, the second oath has a span of time in which to take effect, and takes effect.
另一个版本:由「只担一次罪责」推知不担罪责而起誓仍在;它的效用就在于第一个起誓解除之后,第二个顶替它。
另一个版本:拉瓦 从密释纳所作的推证是这样的:由「他只须担一次罪责」一语可推知,违犯第二个起誓虽不必献祭,这起誓却仍然有效。
Another version of Rava’s proof from the mishna is that it may be inferred from the statement: He is liable for only one, that although there is no liability to bring an offering for violating the second oath, there is an effective oath.
但既然不担罪责,它是就哪一条 哈拉哈 而言有效呢?
But if there is no liability, then with regard to what halakha is it effective?
当然是就 拉瓦 之说而言有效,因为 拉瓦 说:他若就第一个起誓向贤者请求解除,并获解除,第二个起誓便顶替它算给他。
Certainly it is effective with regard to the statement of Rava, as Rava said: If he requested and received dissolution from a halakhic authority for the first oath, the second is counted for him in its place.
革玛拉提议引一条密释纳支持 拉瓦:许了两期拿细耳愿的人,守满第一期、分出祭物后解除第一个誓愿,第二期便顶替第一期;可见第二个誓愿起初虽无余地,并非全然无效。
革玛拉提议:我们可否说,以下这条密释纳(《誓言卷》叶二十七背)支持他的意见:人许了两期拿细耳人的愿,守满了第一期,分出了一份祭,然后就第一个誓愿向贤者请求解除并获解除,那么第二期顶替第一期算给他。
The Gemara proposes: Let us say that the following mishna (Shevuot 27b) supports his opinion: In the case of one who took two vows of naziriteship, and counted the first term, and set aside an offering, and requested and received dissolution from a halakhic authority for the first oath, the second term counts for him instead of the first.
注:英译此处作「第一个起誓」,实指第一个拿细耳人的誓愿,今照文意译。英译所标出处为《誓言卷》叶二十七背,照录;这段话本身与前文(本卷叶十七背)所引的 《巴拉伊塔》 同,待考。
可见第二期拿细耳人的誓愿起初虽没有生效的余地,却并非全然无效。
Evidently, although initially the second term of naziriteship did not have a span of time in which to take effect, it was not completely void.
所以第一个誓愿一经解除,第二个便当即顶替它。
Therefore, when the first vow was dissolved, the second one immediately took its place.
由此可证,起誓也是如此。
It may be proved from here that this is true with regard to oaths as well.
革玛拉驳回这一证明:那条密释纳可能说的是一次同时承当两期拿细耳愿;两期本就前后相续,与同一时段重复起誓不同。
革玛拉驳回这一证明:那条密释纳讲的可能是他一次同时承当两期拿细耳人誓愿的情形。
The Gemara refutes this proof: That mishna may be referring to a case where he accepted upon himself two terms of naziriteship simultaneously.
两期不能同时并守,所以他一次同时承当两期时,哈拉哈 是第二期紧接着第一期结束而开始;第一期当即生效,两期落在前后相续的时段上。
Since two terms cannot be observed concurrently, when he accepts two terms simultaneously, the halakha is that the second term commences immediately following the close of the first, which immediately took effect upon sequential periods of time.
但人若起誓禁自己某物,而此物在同一时段已因先前的起誓被禁,第二个起誓就可能全然不生效。
However, when one takes an oath prohibiting himself from a matter that is already prohibited by an oath in the same period of time, the second oath may not take effect at all.