25b.1
引证
承叶二十五正末句：惟拜偶像、禁伦之交与流人血三样除外。
-
或是流人血。
or bloodshed.
← 逾越节卷总目·第二章 凡可食之时
这不是译本，是辅读层。中文承载文本本身，并逐句标出哪些是塔木德自己的话、 哪些是 施泰因扎尔茨 补入的解释，以及哪些地方翻译必然有所流失。
谢法利亚 的 威廉·戴维森 版用 <b> 标出塔木德原文，其余为
施泰因扎尔茨 补入。下面的比例是逐句从这个标记算出来的，不是判断。
这一面每读 8 句，只有一句以塔木德自己的话为主。把这件事藏起来， 读者会以为自己读的是塔木德；标出来，他才知道自己站在哪里。
承叶二十五正末句：惟拜偶像、禁伦之交与流人血三样除外。
或是流人血。
or bloodshed.
拜偶像纵在性命垂危时也不可用以医治，这已由「尽性、尽力」那一句得着；禁伦之交与流人血两样又从哪里得来？一条 《巴拉伊塔》 里 拉比犹大·哈纳西 说：论强奸已聘之女的，经上说「但不可办女子，她本没有该死的罪。这事就类乎人起来攻击邻舍，将他杀了一样」（申命记 22:26）。杀人的与被强奸的已聘之女有什么相干？这一处何以提起杀人？
拜偶像纵在人性命垂危时也不可用以医治，这一层已由我们方才所说的得着，就是那一节「尽性、尽力」。那么禁伦之交与流人血两样，这条 哈拉哈 又是从哪里得来的呢？
That one may not heal oneself with idolatry even when his life is in danger is learned from that which we just said, based on the verse: “With all your soul and with all your might.” From where is this halakha derived with regard to forbidden sexual relations and murder?
正如一条 《巴拉伊塔》 所教的，拉比犹大·哈纳西 说：论强奸已聘之女的，经上说：「但不可办女子，她本没有该死的罪。这事就类乎人起来攻击邻舍，将他杀了一样」（申命记 22:26）。
As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The verse says about one who rapes a betrothed woman: “But you shall do nothing to the young woman; the young woman has committed no sin worthy of death; for as when a man rises against his neighbor, and slays him, so too with this matter” (Deuteronomy 22:26).
杀人的与那被强奸的已聘之女，有什么相干呢？
What does a murderer have to do with a betrothed young woman who was raped?
经文在这一处何以提起杀人的事？
Why would the verse mention murder in this context?
提起杀人，本是要教已聘之女那一条 哈拉哈，末了倒也从那一件推出一条来。托拉把杀人的与已聘之女并举，是要教：已聘之女既可取那强暴者的命救她，将被杀的人也可取那追赶者的命救他。反过来也可由杀人的推已聘之女：人被逼去杀人的，宁可自己被杀而不可犯那一条；那么已聘之女也当宁可被杀而不可犯禁伦之交。
其实经文提起杀人，本是要教已聘之女那一条 哈拉哈；末了倒也从那一件推出一条来。
Rather, the mention of murder comes in order to teach a halakha about the betrothed young woman, and it turns out that, in addition, it derives a halakha from that case.
托拉把杀人的与已聘之女并举，是要教人：已聘之女既可取那强暴者的命来救她，那么将被杀的人，也可取那追赶者的命来救他。
The Torah juxtaposes a murderer to a betrothed young woman to indicate that just as in the case of a betrothed young woman one may save her by taking the rapist’s life, so too, one may save a potential murder victim by taking the pursuer’s life.
反过来，也可以从杀人那一件推已聘之女这一件。
Conversely, it is possible to learn about the case of a young betrothed woman from the case of a murderer.
人被逼去杀别人的，这条 哈拉哈 是：他宁可自己被杀，也不可犯那一条禁；那么已聘之女这一条 哈拉哈 也照样：她宁可自己被杀，也不可犯禁伦之交那一条。
Just as with regard to a potential murderer the halakha is that if one is being forced to murder someone else, he should allow himself to be killed and not transgress that prohibition, so too, with regard to a betrothed young woman the halakha is that she should allow herself to be killed and not transgress the prohibition of forbidden relations.
问：杀人本身这条 哈拉哈 又从哪里得来？答：凭理便知——一条命并不比另一条命更要紧。革玛拉举一事为证：有人来见 拉瓦 说，本地的官长吩咐我去杀某人，不然他便杀我。拉瓦 对他说：宁可他杀你，你不可去杀人。你心里想什么呢？当你的血比他的红么？或许那人的血更红。
革玛拉问：那么杀人本身这条 哈拉哈，我们又是从哪里得来的呢？
The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive this halakha with regard to murder itself?
革玛拉答：凭理便知——一条命并不比另一条命更要紧。
The Gemara answers: It is based on logical reasoning that one life is not preferable to another.
革玛拉举一件为证：有人来见 拉瓦，对他说：本地的官长吩咐我去杀某人，我若不去，他便杀我。
The Gemara relates an incident to demonstrate this: This is similar to a certain man who came before Rava and said to him: A local official said to me: Go kill so-and-so, and if not I will kill you.
拉瓦 对他说：宁可他杀你，你不可去杀那人。
Rava said to him: It is preferable that he should kill you and you should not kill.
你心里想的是什么呢？当你的血比他的更红、更贵重么？
What did you think, that your blood is redder and more precious than his?
或许那人的血更红。
Perhaps that man’s blood is redder.
这样看来：人不可取别人的命来救自己的命。
Apparently, one may not save his own life by taking someone else’s.
革玛拉讲一件：玛尔·巴尔·拉夫阿施 撞见 拉维纳 拿 三年果禁 的未熟橄榄给女儿擦身治病。玛尔·巴尔·拉夫阿施 对他说：众贤所说「危难之时可从这样的禁物得益处」固然不错，可谁说不在危难之时也许呢？
革玛拉讲一件：玛尔·巴尔·拉夫阿施 撞见 拉维纳 拿 三年果禁 的未熟橄榄给自己的女儿擦身，为的是治病。
The Gemara relates: Mar bar Rav Ashi found Ravina rubbing his daughter with unripe olives [guharkei] of orla for medicinal purposes.
玛尔·巴尔·拉夫阿施 对他说：众贤所说「危难之时人可以从这样的禁物得益处」固然不错，可谁说不在危难之时也是许的呢？
Mar bar Rav Ashi said to him: Say that the Sages said that one may derive benefit from such a prohibited item at a time of danger; however, who says that one is permitted to do so when it is not a time of danger?
拉维纳 回他说：高烧也算危难之时，那时从禁物得益处是许的。另一传作：拉维纳 回说——我这样得益处，是按常法么？（这几样橄榄的常法是等熟了榨油；他既不按常法，纵女儿不至于性命垂危，也是许的。）
拉维纳 对他说：高烧也算作危难之时；那时人从禁物得益处是许的。
Ravina said to him: A high fever is also deemed a time of danger, and one may derive benefit from a prohibited item it such a situation.
也有人说 拉维纳 回他的话是这样：我这样得益处，是按常法么？
Some say that Ravina said to him as follows: Am I deriving benefit in a usual manner?
从这几样橄榄得益处的常法，是等它们熟了、好把油榨出来。
The usual way to derive benefit from these olives is to use them after they have become ripe, so that their oil can be drawn out.
拉维纳 既不是按常法得益处，便是许的，虽说他女儿并不至于性命垂危。
Since Ravina was not deriving benefit in the usual manner, he was permitted to do so, although his daughter’s life was not in danger.
革玛拉接着论禁物上几条 哈拉哈。有一传：禁物之益处非人所愿而临到的（就是人并非为得益处而置身其中，境遇却使他得了益处），阿巴耶 说这样得益处是许的，拉瓦 说是禁的。
革玛拉接着论禁物上几条 哈拉哈。
The Gemara continues to discuss various halakhot that apply to prohibited items.
有一传是这样：禁物的益处非人所愿而临到他身上的——就是说，人并不是为得那益处才置身于那境遇，境遇却使他得了益处——阿巴耶 说这样得益处是许的，拉瓦 说是禁的。
It was stated: With regard to deriving benefit from a prohibited item that comes to a person against his will, i.e., one’s circumstance results in his deriving benefit although he did not place himself in that circumstance in order to derive benefit, Abaye said: Deriving benefit in this manner is permitted, and Rava said: It is prohibited.
革玛拉说明：躲得开而他有意得益处的，或躲不开而他有意得益处的，众人同认为禁——他既存心要得那禁着的益处。躲不开而他无意得益处的，众人同认为许——他本无可选择。所争的是：躲得开而他无意得益处的那一种。
革玛拉说明：人躲得开那益处而有意去得的，或躲不开而有意去得的，众人同认那是禁的，因他存心要得那禁着的益处。
The Gemara explains: In a case where it is possible to avoid deriving benefit and he intends to derive benefit from the prohibited object, or where it is not possible to avoid it and he intends to derive benefit, everyone agrees that it is prohibited, because he intended to derive benefit that was prohibited.
至于躲不开而他无意得那益处的，众人同认那是许的，因他本无可选择。
And when it is not possible to avoid it and he does not intend to derive benefit, everyone agrees that it is permitted, as one had no choice in the matter.
他们所争的，是人躲得开那禁物而无意得益处的那一种光景。
Where they disagree is in a case where it is possible for him to avoid the prohibition, and he does not intend to derive benefit from it.
再划细：照 拉比犹大（他说无心而犯禁仍算禁），众人同认为禁——他以为所行重于所存之心。所争是照 拉比西缅（他说无心而犯禁是许的）：阿巴耶 与 拉比西缅 同持；拉瓦 则说 拉比西缅 那话只就躲不开的光景说，躲得开的他并不许。这是一传。
革玛拉再把所争划细：照 拉比犹大 的意思——他说无心而犯的禁仍算作禁——众人同认那是禁的，因 拉比犹大 以为人所行的重于他所存的心。
The Gemara limits the dispute further: And according to Rabbi Yehuda, who said that an unintentional prohibited act is prohibited, everyone agrees that it is prohibited, as Rabbi Yehuda maintains that one’s action is more significant than his intent.
他们所争的，是照 拉比西缅 的意思——他说无心而犯的禁是许的。
Where they disagree is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said that an unintentional prohibited act is permitted.
这样看来，阿巴耶 是与 拉比西缅 同持的。
Apparently, Abaye holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.
而 拉瓦 会说：拉比西缅 那话只就人躲不开那禁的光景说的。
And Rava would say: Rabbi Shimon stated his opinion only with regard to a case where it is not possible to avoid the prohibition.
至于人躲得开那禁的光景，他并不许人从那禁物得益处，纵是无心的也不许。
However, in a case where it is possible to avoid the prohibition, no, he did not permit one to derive benefit from such a prohibition even unintentionally.
这是这一争的一样传法。
This is one version of the dispute.
另一传：躲得开而无意得益处的，正是 拉比犹大 与 拉比西缅 所争的那一件；躲不开而无意的，众人同认为许；所争的是躲不开而有意的那一种。再划细：照 拉比西缅（他随人所存之心），众人同认为禁；所争是照 拉比犹大——他说有意无意并无分别，所争只在躲不躲得开，故躲得开的便是禁的。
也有人把这一争传作这样：人躲得开那益处而无意去得的，正是 拉比犹大 与 拉比西缅 所争的那一件。
Some say that the dispute should be understood as follows: In a case where it is possible to avoid deriving benefit and he does not intend to derive benefit, this is the case of dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon.
至于人躲不开而无意从那禁物得益处的，众人同认那是许的。
Where it is not possible to avoid it and he does not intend to derive benefit from the prohibited item, everyone agrees that it is permitted to do so.
他们所争的，是人躲不开而有意从那禁物得益处的那一种。
Where they disagree is in a case where it is not possible to avoid deriving benefit and he intends to derive benefit from it.
革玛拉再把所争划细：照 拉比西缅 的意思——他是随人所存之心而论的——众人同认那是禁的。
The Gemara limits the dispute further: According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who follows one’s intent, everyone agrees that it is prohibited.
他们所争的，是照 拉比犹大 的意思——他说有意无意并无分别，所争只在人躲不躲得开。
Where they disagree is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: There is no difference whether one intends or does not intend; the issue is whether he can avoid it or not.
既是如此，人躲得开那益处的，便是禁的。
Therefore, if it is possible to avoid deriving benefit, it is prohibited.
照这一样读法，阿巴耶 便是与 拉比犹大 同持——就是说，人若全然躲不开那境遇，纵存了心要得益处，也是许的。
照这一样读法，阿巴耶 便是与 拉比犹大 同持的。
Based on this understanding of the dispute, Abaye holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
换句话说：人若全然躲不开那境遇，纵存了心要得那益处，也是许的。
In other words, in a case where it is not possible to avoid the situation completely, even if one has intent it is permitted.