——因为他可以在自己与那几座坟之间设个间隔,如此去吃那作 合界 的食物而不染不洁。
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——因为他可以在自己与那几座坟之间设个间隔,如此去吃那作 合界 的食物而不染不洁。
since he can interpose between himself and the graves and go and eat the food that comprises the eiruv without contracting ritual impurity.
← 移入纹卷总目·第三章 以何物合界
这不是译本,是辅读层。中文承载文本本身,并逐句标出哪些是塔木德自己的话、 哪些是 施泰因扎尔茨 补入的解释,以及哪些地方翻译必然有所流失。
谢法利亚 的 威廉·戴维森 版用 <b> 标出塔木德原文,其余为
施泰因扎尔茨 补入。下面的比例是逐句从这个标记算出来的,不是判断。
这一面每读 6 句,只有一句以塔木德自己的话为主。把这件事藏起来, 读者会以为自己读的是塔木德;标出来,他才知道自己站在哪里。
——因为他可以在自己与那几座坟之间设个间隔,如此去吃那作 合界 的食物而不染不洁。
——因为他可以在自己与那几座坟之间设个间隔,如此去吃那作 合界 的食物而不染不洁。
since he can interpose between himself and the graves and go and eat the food that comprises the eiruv without contracting ritual impurity.
拉比约哈难 说:凡通则之言,不可据以推断——就是说,密释纳里用「凡」字所立的通则,不当看作毫无例外、包罗无遗的话。纵在它说了「惟……不然」的地方,也是如此。那样的地方,仍可能有没列出来的例外。
拉比约哈难 说:凡通则之言,不可据以推断——就是说,密释纳里用「凡」字所立的通则,不当看作毫无例外、包罗无遗的话。
Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One may not learn from general statements, i.e., when a general statement is made in a mishna using the word all, it is not to be understood as an all-inclusive, general statement without exceptions.
纵在它说了「惟……不然」的地方,也是如此。
This is true even in a place where it says the word except.
那样的地方,仍可能有没列出来的例外。
Even in that case, there may be other exceptions to the rule that are not listed.
革玛拉 指出:拉比约哈难 既说「纵在它说了『惟……不然』的地方」,可推知他所论的不是这里密释纳所立的通则——这一条本来就说了「惟……不然」。那么他立这条通则的时候,所论的是哪一条密释纳呢?
革玛拉 指出:拉比约哈难 既说「纵在它说了『惟……不然』的地方」,可推知他所论的不是这里密释纳所立的通则——这一条本来就说了「惟……不然」。
The Gemara notes: From the fact that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even in a place where it says except, this proves by inference that he was not relating to the general statement made here in the mishna, which uses the word except.
那么他立这条通则的时候,所论的是哪一条密释纳呢?
To which mishna, then, was he relating when he formulated his principle?
革玛拉 答:他所论的是那边一条密释纳:凡系于时候的当行之诫——就是只可在一日之内某时、或只可在白日而不可在夜间、或只可在一年之内某几日行的诫命——男子有当行之责,妇人免。至于不系于时候的当行之诫,妇人与男子一样都有当行之责。
革玛拉 答:他所论的是那边一条密释纳:凡系于时候的当行之诫——就是只可在一日之内某时、或只可在白日而不可在夜间、或只可在一年之内某几日行的诫命——男子有当行之责,妇人免。
The Gemara answers: He was relating to a mishna found there: With regard to all time-bound, positive commandments, i.e., mitzvot that can only be performed at a certain time of the day, or during the day rather than at night, or on certain days of the year, men are obligated to perform them and women are exempt.
至于不系于时候的当行之诫,妇人与男子一样都有当行之责。
But positive commandments that are not time-bound, both women and men are obligated to perform.
这岂是一条通则,说妇人于凡系于时候的当行之诫都免、毫无例外么?可还有逾越节吃 无酵饼 之诫、节期喜乐之诫、并安息年后 住棚节 之节里七年一次在殿院聚集之诫——那几样都是系于时候的当行之诫,妇人却都有当行之责。
这岂是一条通则,说妇人于凡系于时候的当行之诫都免、毫无例外么?
Is it a general principle that women are exempt from all time-bound, positive commandments without exception?
可还有逾越节吃 无酵饼 之诫、节期喜乐之诫、并安息年后 住棚节 之节里七年一次在殿院聚集之诫——那几样都是系于时候的当行之诫,妇人却都有当行之责。
But there is the commandment to eat matza on Passover, the commandment of rejoicing on a Festival, and the commandment of assembly in the Temple courtyard once every seven years during the festival of Sukkot following the Sabbatical Year, all of which are time-bound, positive commandments, and nevertheless, women are obligated to perform them.
照样,妇人于凡不系于时候的当行之诫,都有当行之责么?可还有研习 妥拉 之诫、生养众多之诫、赎头生之诫——那几样都是不系于时候的当行之诫,妇人却都免。所以 拉比约哈难 说:凡通则之言,不可据以推断,纵在它说了「惟……不然」的地方也是如此,因为总可能另有没列出来的例外。
照样,妇人于凡不系于时候的当行之诫,都有当行之责么?
Similarly, are women obligated in all positive commandments that are not time-bound?
可还有研习 妥拉 之诫、生养众多之诫、赎头生之诫——那几样都是不系于时候的当行之诫,妇人却都免。
But there is the commandment of Torah study, the commandment to be fruitful and multiply, and the commandment of redemption of the firstborn, all of which are positive commandments that are not time-bound, and nevertheless, women are exempt from them.
所以 拉比约哈难 说:凡通则之言,不可据以推断,纵在它说了「惟……不然」的地方也是如此,因为总可能另有没列出来的例外。
Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One may not learn from general statements, even in a place where it says except, because it is always possible that there other exceptions to the rule.
阿巴耶 说——有人说是 拉比耶利米 说的:我们也从一条密释纳里学过一证,帮 拉比约哈难 那条通则:他们又立一条通则说:凡被 漏症者 抬着的都是不洁的。凡抬着 漏症者 的都是洁的,惟合于躺卧或坐的物件与人不然——漏症者 若被它们抬着,它们就成为不洁。于此可提一驳:再没有别的了么?可还有人所骑的物件也成为不洁,那是 妥拉 本身讲明了的。
阿巴耶 说——有人说是 拉比耶利米 说的:我们也从一条密释纳里学过一证,帮 拉比约哈难 那条通则:他们又立一条通则说:凡被 漏症者 抬着的都是不洁的。
Abaye said, and some say it was Rabbi Yirmeya who said: We, too, have also learned a proof for Rabbi Yoḥanan’s principle from a mishna: They stated yet another general principle: Anything that is carried upon a zav is ritually impure.
凡抬着 漏症者 的都是洁的,惟合于躺卧或坐的物件与人不然——漏症者 若被它们抬着,它们就成为不洁。
And anything on which a zav is carried is ritually pure, except for an object suitable for lying or sitting upon and a human being, which become defiled if a zav is borne on them.
于此可提一驳:再没有别的了么?
The following objection may be raised: And is there nothing else?
可还有人所骑的物件也成为不洁,那是 妥拉 本身讲明了的。
But there is an object upon which a person rides that becomes impure, as explained in the Torah itself.
革玛拉 先问:所骑的物件是哪一样情形呢?他若坐在其上,那就是座了。若不然,它怎么成为不洁呢?什么东西合于骑,却不入躺卧或坐之物那一类呢?革玛拉 答:我们这样说:有鞍的上段——那是作骑具而成为不洁的,不是作寻常的座。正如 《托塞夫塔》 所教的:漏症者 坐过的鞍,是作 漏症者 的座而不洁的;那鞍桥——就是接在鞍前、骑者用来稳住身子或借力上马的——是作骑具而不洁的。可见密释纳所立的通则漏了合于骑的那一样。所以当从这里断定:凡通则之言不可据以推断,纵在它说了「惟……不然」的地方也是如此。
革玛拉 先问:所骑的物件是哪一样情形呢?
The Gemara first asks: What are the circumstances of an object upon which one rides?
他若坐在其上,那就是座了。
If he sat upon it, it is a seat.
若不然,它怎么成为不洁呢?
If not, how does it become defiled?
什么东西合于骑,却不入躺卧或坐之物那一类呢?
What is there that is suitable for riding upon but does not fall into the category of something upon which one lies or sits?
革玛拉 答:我们这样说:有鞍的上段——那是作骑具而成为不洁的,不是作寻常的座。
The Gemara answers: We say as follows: There is the upper part of a saddle, which becomes ritually impure as a riding accessory and not as a regular seat.
正如 《托塞夫塔》 所教的:漏症者 坐过的鞍,是作 漏症者 的座而不洁的;那鞍桥——就是接在鞍前、骑者用来稳住身子或借力上马的——是作骑具而不洁的。
As it was taught in the Tosefta: A saddle upon which a zav sat is impure as a seat of a zav, and the pommel, which is attached to the front of the saddle and used by the rider to maintain his position or to assist in mounting, is impure as a riding accessory.
可见密释纳所立的通则漏了合于骑的那一样。
Therefore, we see that the general statement found in the mishna omits that which is suitable for riding upon.
所以当从这里断定:凡通则之言不可据以推断,纵在它说了「惟……不然」的地方也是如此。
Rather, conclude from this that one may not learn from general statements, even in a place where it says except.
拉维纳 说——有人说是 拉夫纳赫曼 说的:我们也从密释纳里学过一证,帮 拉比约哈难 那条通则,就是那一句:人可以用各样食物立 合界、合巷道,惟水与盐不可。再没有别的了么?可还有块菌与蘑菇也不可用来立 合界,因为那两样算不得食物。所以当从这里断定:凡通则之言不可据以推断,纵在它说了「惟……不然」的地方也是如此。
拉维纳 说——有人说是 拉夫纳赫曼 说的:我们也从密释纳里学过一证,帮 拉比约哈难 那条通则,就是那一句:人可以用各样食物立 合界、合巷道,惟水与盐不可。
Ravina said, and some say it was Rav Naḥman who said: We, too, have also learned a proof for Rabbi Yoḥanan’s principle from the mishna, which states: One may establish an eiruv and merge alleyways with all kinds of food, except for water and salt.
再没有别的了么?
And is there nothing else?
可还有块菌与蘑菇也不可用来立 合界,因为那两样算不得食物。
But there are truffles and mushrooms, which also may not be used for an eiruv because they are not regarded as food.
所以当从这里断定:凡通则之言不可据以推断,纵在它说了「惟……不然」的地方也是如此。
Rather, conclude from this that one may not learn from general statements, even in a place where it says except.
我们在密释纳里学过:凡食物都可以用第二样什一之银去买,惟水与盐不可。拉比以利以谢 与 拉比约西·巴尔·哈尼纳 所得的传说本是一样,只是一位把它教在 合界 那一题上,一位把它教在第二样什一那一题上。
我们在密释纳里学过:凡食物都可以用第二样什一之银去买,惟水与盐不可。
We learned in the mishna: All types of food may be bought with second-tithe money, except for water and salt.
拉比以利以谢 与 拉比约西·巴尔·哈尼纳 所得的传说本是一样,只是一位把它教在 合界 那一题上,一位把它教在第二样什一那一题上。
Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina both had the same tradition, but one teaches it with regard to eiruv, and one teaches it with regard to the second tithe.
革玛拉 细说:一位把这条 哈拉哈 教在 合界 那一题上,这样说:他们说水与盐不可用来立 合界,单指水自己一样、盐自己一样。水与盐和在一处,倒实在可以用来立 合界。
革玛拉 细说:一位把这条 哈拉哈 教在 合界 那一题上,这样说:他们说水与盐不可用来立 合界,单指水自己一样、盐自己一样。
The Gemara elaborates: One teaches this halakha with regard to the issue of eiruv, as follows: They only taught that one may not establish an eiruv with water or salt in the case of water by itself or salt by itself.
水与盐和在一处,倒实在可以用来立 合界。
But with water and salt together, one may indeed establish an eiruv.
另一位把这条 哈拉哈 教在第二样什一那一题上:他们说水与盐不可用第二样什一之银买,单指水自己一样、盐自己一样。水与盐和在一处,倒实在可以用第二样什一之银买。
另一位把这条 哈拉哈 教在第二样什一那一题上:他们说水与盐不可用第二样什一之银买,单指水自己一样、盐自己一样。
And the other one teaches this halakha with regard to the issue of the second tithe: They only taught that water or salt may not be bought with second-tithe money in the case of water by itself or salt by itself.
水与盐和在一处,倒实在可以用第二样什一之银买。
But water and salt mixed together may indeed be bought with second-tithe money.
革玛拉 说:那把这条律教在第二样什一上的,于 合界 更是要许——就是说他断然以为水与盐和在一处合于立 合界。只是那把这条律教在 合界 上的,就单于 合界 说得通;至于第二样什一,那就不然了。这一分别是什么缘故呢?因为论第二样什一,妥拉 说所要的是地里的出产,而水与盐纵和在一处,也没有出产的分位。
革玛拉 说:那把这条律教在第二样什一上的,于 合界 更是要许——就是说他断然以为水与盐和在一处合于立 合界。
The Gemara comments: The one who teaches this law with regard to the second tithe, all the more so would he apply it to an eiruv, i.e., he would certainly maintain that water and salt together are suitable to be used for an eiruv.
只是那把这条律教在 合界 上的,就单于 合界 说得通;至于第二样什一,那就不然了。
However, according to the one who teaches this law with regard to an eiruv, it applies only to an eiruv; but with regard to the second tithe, no, it does not apply.
这一分别是什么缘故呢?
What is the reason for this distinction?
因为论第二样什一,妥拉 说所要的是地里的出产,而水与盐纵和在一处,也没有出产的分位。
For the second tithe, we require produce, as stated in the Torah, and even when water and salt are mixed together they do not have the status of produce.
拉比以撒 从 以色列地 下到巴比伦时,把这条律教在第二样什一那一题上。革玛拉 据下头这条 《巴拉伊塔》 提一驳:拉比犹大·本·加迪什 在 拉比以利以谢 面前作见证说:在我父家,他们常用第二样什一之银买鱼卤。他对他说:只怕你所听见的,单是那卤里掺了鱼脏的一样。那样的和物既含着一点鱼在内,那卤就够分量、可以用第二样什一之银买了。就连 拉比犹大·本·加迪什 所说的,也单指那卤——那是出产的脂,因为其中掺着一点鱼脂,而鱼脂本身是可以用第二样什一之银买的;至于单是水与盐的和物,那就不可用它买。
拉比以撒 从 以色列地 下到巴比伦时,把这条律教在第二样什一那一题上。
When Rabbi Yitzḥak came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he taught this law with regard to the second tithe.
革玛拉 据下头这条 《巴拉伊塔》 提一驳:拉比犹大·本·加迪什 在 拉比以利以谢 面前作见证说:在我父家,他们常用第二样什一之银买鱼卤。
The Gemara raises an objection from the following baraita: Rabbi Yehuda ben Gadish testified before Rabbi Eliezer: In Father’s house they would buy fish brine with second-tithe money.
他对他说:只怕你所听见的,单是那卤里掺了鱼脏的一样。
He said to him: Perhaps you only heard this in a case where the fish’s innards were mixed with the brine.
那样的和物既含着一点鱼在内,那卤就够分量、可以用第二样什一之银买了。
Since this mixture contains a small portion of the fish, the brine becomes significant enough to be purchased with second-tithe money.
就连 拉比犹大·本·加迪什 所说的,也单指那卤——那是出产的脂,因为其中掺着一点鱼脂,而鱼脂本身是可以用第二样什一之银买的;至于单是水与盐的和物,那就不可用它买。
And even Rabbi Yehuda ben Gadish only said his statement with regard to brine, which is the fat of produce, i.e., because a certain amount of fish fat, which itself may be purchased with second-tithe money, is mixed in with the brine; but a mixture of water and salt alone may not be bought with it.
拉夫约瑟 答这个难处说——
拉夫约瑟 答这个难处说——
In response to this difficulty, Rav Yosef said: