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这不是译本，是辅读层。中文承载文本本身，并逐句标出哪些是塔木德自己的话、 哪些是 施泰因扎尔茨 补入的解释，以及哪些地方翻译必然有所流失。
谢法利亚 的 威廉·戴维森 版用 <b> 标出塔木德原文，其余为
施泰因扎尔茨 补入。下面的比例是逐句从这个标记算出来的，不是判断。
这一面每读 7 句，只有一句以塔木德自己的话为主。把这件事藏起来， 读者会以为自己读的是塔木德；标出来，他才知道自己站在哪里。
只是论众拉比所定之律，我们倒靠「受托的人必办成所受之托」这一推定。拉夫舍舍特 不以为然，说：这一样那一样——不拘 妥拉 之律还是拉比之律——我们都靠这一推定。
只是论众拉比所定之律，我们倒靠「受托的人必办成所受之托」这一推定。
However, with regard to rabbinic laws, we do rely on the presumption that an agent fulfills his agency.
拉夫舍舍特 不以为然，说：这一样那一样——不拘 妥拉 之律还是拉比之律——我们都靠这一推定。
And Rav Sheshet disagreed and said: With regard to both this, Torah law, and that, rabbinic law, we rely on the presumption that an agent fulfills his agency.
拉夫舍舍特 说：我这话是从哪里说的呢？因为我们在一条密释纳里学过：初熟之捆 一献上，新收的粮当即许吃。妥拉 禁人吃新收的粮，直到逾越节第二日献上 初熟之捆 之祭（利未记 23:14）；初熟之捆 一献上，新粮当即可吃。
拉夫舍舍特 说：我这话是从哪里说的呢？
Rav Sheshet said: From where do I say this?
因为我们在一条密释纳里学过：初熟之捆 一献上，新收的粮当即许吃。
As we learned in a mishna: Once the omer has been offered, the grain from the new crop is immediately permitted.
妥拉 禁人吃新收的粮，直到逾越节第二日献上 初熟之捆 之祭（利未记 23:14）；初熟之捆 一献上，新粮当即可吃。
The Torah prohibits eating from the new crop of grain until the omer sacrifice is offered on the second day of Passover (Leviticus 23:14); once the omer is offered, it is immediately permitted to partake of the new grain.
那些离耶路撒冷远、不知 初熟之捆 献了没有的人，从正午起就许吃新粮，因为到那时候 初熟之捆 断然已经献上了。禁吃新粮岂不是 妥拉 之律么？却仍教说：那些离耶路撒冷远的，从正午起就许吃新粮。这岂不是因为我们可以靠「受托的人必办成所受之托」这一推定么？殿里的祭司是全以色列的受托人，人当推定他们已办成所受之托。
那些离耶路撒冷远、不知 初熟之捆 献了没有的人，从正午起就许吃新粮，因为到那时候 初熟之捆 断然已经献上了。
And those far from Jerusalem, who do not know whether or not the omer has already been offered, are permitted to eat from the new crop from midday and on, as the omer must surely have been offered by this time.
禁吃新粮岂不是 妥拉 之律么？
Isn’t the prohibition to eat from the new crop a Torah law?
却仍教说：那些离耶路撒冷远的，从正午起就许吃新粮。
And nevertheless, it was taught: And those far from Jerusalem are permitted to eat from the new crop from midday and on.
这岂不是因为我们可以靠「受托的人必办成所受之托」这一推定么？
Is this not because we may rely on the presumption that an agent fulfills his agency?
殿里的祭司是全以色列的受托人，人当推定他们已办成所受之托。
The priests in the Temple serve as the agents of the entire Jewish people, and it may be assumed that they have performed the mission entrusted to them.
革玛拉 问：拉夫纳赫曼 既以为论 妥拉 之律不可靠这一推定，他怎样驳这一证呢？他可以这样答：那里所以信得过，缘故是那条明明教出来的——因为我们知道公会办 初熟之捆 之祭断不至懒怠；至于寻常的受托人，就说不得这话了。
革玛拉 问：拉夫纳赫曼 既以为论 妥拉 之律不可靠这一推定，他怎样驳这一证呢？
The Gemara asks: And how does Rav Naḥman, who holds that with respect to Torah laws we may not rely on the presumption that an agent fulfills his agency, refute this proof?
他可以这样答：那里所以信得过，缘故是那条明明教出来的——因为我们知道公会办 初熟之捆 之祭断不至懒怠；至于寻常的受托人，就说不得这话了。
He can respond as follows: There, the agents may be trusted for the reason that was explicitly taught: Because we know that the court will not be indolent in offering the omer sacrifice; however, the same cannot be said of ordinary agents.
有人把这一答传作另一样：拉夫纳赫曼 说：我这条道理是从哪里说的呢？因为所教的缘故是：我们知道公会断不至懒怠、把 初熟之捆 拖过正午。由此可推：断不至懒怠的是公会，寻常的受托人于所受之托倒可能懒怠。所以我们靠不得寻常的受托人。
有人把这一答传作另一样：拉夫纳赫曼 说：我这条道理是从哪里说的呢？
And some say a different version of this response: Rav Naḥman said: From where do I say this principle?
因为所教的缘故是：我们知道公会断不至懒怠、把 初熟之捆 拖过正午。
As it was taught that the reason is because we know that the court will not be indolent in offering the omer past midday.
由此可推：断不至懒怠的是公会，寻常的受托人于所受之托倒可能懒怠。
From this we may infer: It is the court that will not be indolent with regard to missions entrusted to it, but an ordinary agent may indeed be indolent with regard to his mission.
所以我们靠不得寻常的受托人。
Therefore, we cannot rely upon an ordinary agent.
拉夫舍舍特 却可以对你说：那样推不对；倒当这样推：惟公会才当推定它正午以先已办成所受之托，虽然献 初熟之捆 那一条诫命整日都行得。至于寻常的受托人，既不那样勤谨，就单当推定他到那一整日之末已办成所受之托。
拉夫舍舍特 却可以对你说：那样推不对；倒当这样推：惟公会才当推定它正午以先已办成所受之托，虽然献 初熟之捆 那一条诫命整日都行得。
And Rav Sheshet could have said to you that this is not the correct inference; rather, we should infer as follows: It is only the court that is presumed to have executed its mission by midday, even though the mitzva to bring the omer offering lasts all day.
至于寻常的受托人，既不那样勤谨，就单当推定他到那一整日之末已办成所受之托。
However, an ordinary agent, who is not as diligent, is only presumed to have completed his mission by the end of the entire day.
拉夫舍舍特 说：我这个意思是从哪里说的呢？因为有一条 《巴拉伊塔》 教说：妇人产后、或患过 漏症（利未记 12、15 章）而当献祭的，把银子拿来投进殿里所设的箱，浸洗了，天黑就可以吃圣物。她天黑就许吃，是什么缘故呢？这岂不是因为我们说「受托的人必办成所受之托」——祭司断然已用她的银子买了当献的祭牲、当日献上了么？
拉夫舍舍特 说：我这个意思是从哪里说的呢？
Rav Sheshet said: From where do I say my opinion?
因为有一条 《巴拉伊塔》 教说：妇人产后、或患过 漏症（利未记 12、15 章）而当献祭的，把银子拿来投进殿里所设的箱，浸洗了，天黑就可以吃圣物。
As it was taught in a baraita: A woman who is responsible to offer sacrifices following childbirth or after experiencing ziva (Leviticus 12, 15) brings money and puts it in the appropriate collection box in the Temple, immerses in a ritual bath, and she may then eat sacrificial food at nightfall.
她天黑就许吃，是什么缘故呢？
What is the reason that she is permitted to eat immediately at nightfall?
这岂不是因为我们说「受托的人必办成所受之托」——祭司断然已用她的银子买了当献的祭牲、当日献上了么？
Is it not because we say that there is a presumption that an agent fulfills his agency, and the priests certainly purchased the appropriate sacrifices with her money and offered them during the day?
革玛拉 问：拉夫纳赫曼 怎样对这一证呢？那里论把银子投箱的妇人，她所以靠得住那受托之事，正如 拉夫谢玛亚 所说的——拉夫谢玛亚 说：在律上当推定祭司的公会不把箱里的银子花尽买了祭牲就不散殿。我们所靠的单是那受命办这一事的特设公会，那是信得过的。至于寻常的受托人，从这里引不出证据来。
革玛拉 问：拉夫纳赫曼 怎样对这一证呢？
The Gemara asks: And how does Rav Naḥman counter this proof?
那里论把银子投箱的妇人，她所以靠得住那受托之事，正如 拉夫谢玛亚 所说的——拉夫谢玛亚 说：在律上当推定祭司的公会不把箱里的银子花尽买了祭牲就不散殿。
There, in the case of a woman who put money in the box, the reason she may rely on agency is in accordance with the statement of Rav Shemaya, as Rav Shemaya said: There is a legal presumption that the court of priests would not leave the Temple until all the money in the collection box has been spent on the purchase of sacrifices.
我们所靠的单是那受命办这一事的特设公会，那是信得过的。
We may rely only on the special court appointed to carry out this task, as it can be trusted.
至于寻常的受托人，从这里引不出证据来。
However, no proof may be brought from here with regard to an ordinary agent.
拉夫舍舍特 又举一证说：我这话是从哪里说的呢？因为有一条 《巴拉伊塔》 教说：人若对另一个人说「你去，从我的无花果树上摘些自己吃」，若没有指定他可摘多少，那摘的人可以随口吃、不必先分什一。只是他若要把那无花果当作一餐正经吃，就须先分什一，当它是断然还没有分过什一的果子。那样情形，人当推定树主并没有为这几个无花果分过什一，因为他并不知道那摘的人要摘多少。只是树主若对他说「你拿这个筐，从我的无花果树上摘满了自己吃」，他随口吃可以不分什一；要当作一餐正经吃以先，就须当它是 未净什一税食物、就是不知分过什一没有的出产而分什一。因为树主既知道那摘的人要摘多少，他就可能已经为这几个无花果分过什一了。
拉夫舍舍特 又举一证说：我这话是从哪里说的呢？
Rav Sheshet said another proof: From where do I say this?
因为有一条 《巴拉伊塔》 教说：人若对另一个人说「你去，从我的无花果树上摘些自己吃」，若没有指定他可摘多少，那摘的人可以随口吃、不必先分什一。
As it was taught in a baraita: One who says to another person: Go and gather for yourself figs from my fig tree, if he does not specify the amount that he should take, the gatherer may eat casually from them even without separating tithes.
只是他若要把那无花果当作一餐正经吃，就须先分什一，当它是断然还没有分过什一的果子。
However, if one wishes to eat the figs as a regular, set meal, he must first tithe them as fruit that is known with certainty not to previously be tithed.
那样情形，人当推定树主并没有为这几个无花果分过什一，因为他并不知道那摘的人要摘多少。
In this case, it may be assumed that the owner of the fig tree did not separate tithes to exempt these figs, as he did not know how many the gatherer would take.
只是树主若对他说「你拿这个筐，从我的无花果树上摘满了自己吃」，他随口吃可以不分什一；要当作一餐正经吃以先，就须当它是 未净什一税食物、就是不知分过什一没有的出产而分什一。
However, if the owner of the fig tree said to him: Fill this basket for yourself with figs from my fig tree, he may eat from them casually without tithing, and before eating them as a regular meal, he must tithe them as demai, produce with regard to which we are unsure if the appropriate tithes have been separated.
因为树主既知道那摘的人要摘多少，他就可能已经为这几个无花果分过什一了。
Since the owner of the tree knows how many figs the gatherer will take, it is possible that he has already separated tithes for these figs.
这话是就哪一样情形说的呢？是就那树主是 地之民 的一样。树主若是 谨守之人，那摘的人尽可吃，连当 未净什一税食物 分什一也不必——因为树主断然已从别处的出产为它们分过什一了：这是 拉比犹大·哈纳西 的话。他父亲 拉班西缅·本·迦玛列 所说的正相反：这话是就哪一样情形说的呢？是就那树主是 地之民 的一样。树主若是 谨守之人，那摘的人非先分什一不可吃，因为 谨守之人 一类的人于诸 哈拉哈 谨守，不至于从不在那出产近处的出产为它分取 举祭 与什一。所摘的无花果既不在树主别的无花果近处，他断然没有为它们分过 举祭 与什一。
这话是就哪一样情形说的呢？
In what case is this statement said?
是就那树主是 地之民 的一样。
Where the owner of the fig tree is an am ha’aretz.
树主若是 谨守之人，那摘的人尽可吃，连当 未净什一税食物 分什一也不必——因为树主断然已从别处的出产为它们分过什一了：这是 拉比犹大·哈纳西 的话。
But if he is a ḥaver, the gatherer may eat the figs, and he need not tithe them even as demai, as the owner certainly separated tithes for them from other produce; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
他父亲 拉班西缅·本·迦玛列 所说的正相反：这话是就哪一样情形说的呢？
His father, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, says the opposite: In what case is this statement said?
是就那树主是 地之民 的一样。
Where the owner of the fig tree is an am ha’aretz.
树主若是 谨守之人，那摘的人非先分什一不可吃，因为 谨守之人 一类的人于诸 哈拉哈 谨守，不至于从不在那出产近处的出产为它分取 举祭 与什一。
But if he is a ḥaver, the gatherer may not eat the fruit until he tithes them because ḥaverim, who are meticulous in their observance of halakha, are not suspected of separating teruma and tithes from produce that is not adjacent to the produce they seek to exempt.
所摘的无花果既不在树主别的无花果近处，他断然没有为它们分过 举祭 与什一。
Since the figs that have been picked are not adjacent to the owner’s other figs, he has certainly not separated teruma and tithes on their account.
拉比犹大·哈纳西 说：我的话看着比父亲的话更是：宁可疑 谨守之人 从不在近处的出产分取 举祭 与什一，也不可叫他们把 未分什一之物 给 地之民 吃。
拉比犹大·哈纳西 说：我的话看着比父亲的话更是：宁可疑 谨守之人 从不在近处的出产分取 举祭 与什一，也不可叫他们把 未分什一之物 给 地之民 吃。
Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: My statement appears to be more correct than Father’s statement: It is better that ḥaverim should be suspected of separating teruma and tithes from produce that is not adjacent to the produce they seek to exempt, and they should not feed amei ha’aretz produce that is tevel.
革玛拉 推说：众 坦拿 所争的单在这一点：一位、就是 拉比犹大·哈纳西，以为 谨守之人 可疑他从不在近处的出产分什一；一位、就是 拉班西缅·本·迦玛列，以为不可这样疑他。至于「受托的人必办成所受之托」这一推定，两下都是靠的——那树主既算作受托为自己的出产分什一、免得人因他而吃了 未分什一之物，就靠得住他必分了什一。
革玛拉 推说：众 坦拿 所争的单在这一点：一位、就是 拉比犹大·哈纳西，以为 谨守之人 可疑他从不在近处的出产分什一；一位、就是 拉班西缅·本·迦玛列，以为不可这样疑他。
The Gemara infers: The tanna’im disagreed only with regard to the following point: That one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, holds that ḥaverim are suspected of tithing with produce that is not adjacent to the produce it comes to exempt, and one Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that they are not suspected of that.
至于「受托的人必办成所受之托」这一推定，两下都是靠的——那树主既算作受托为自己的出产分什一、免得人因他而吃了 未分什一之物，就靠得住他必分了什一。
But all agree that we may rely on the presumption that an agent fulfills his agency, i.e., that the owner, who is regarded as an agent to tithe his produce so that no one will eat tevel on his account, can be relied upon to separate the tithes.
拉夫纳赫曼 却可以这样答：那里树主所以信得过，正如 胡兹人拉夫哈尼纳 所说的——胡兹人拉夫哈尼纳 说：论 谨守之人，在律上当推定他不把没有分过什一的东西放出自己手去。所以我们所靠的不是论受托之人的通例，乃是论 谨守之人 的推定。
拉夫纳赫曼 却可以这样答：那里树主所以信得过，正如 胡兹人拉夫哈尼纳 所说的——胡兹人拉夫哈尼纳 说：论 谨守之人，在律上当推定他不把没有分过什一的东西放出自己手去。
And Rav Naḥman can respond as follows: There, the owner can be trusted, in accordance with the statement of Rav Ḥanina Ḥoza’a, as Rav Ḥanina Ḥoza’a said: There is a legal presumption with regard to a ḥaver that he does not release anything that is not tithed from his possession.
所以我们所靠的不是论受托之人的通例，乃是论 谨守之人 的推定。
Therefore, we are not relying on a general presumption with regard to agents but on a presumption with regard to ḥaverim.
上头那条 《巴拉伊塔》 里有几处费解之处。革玛拉 既议完了主题、就是「受托的人必办成所受之托」那一条，如今就来议那条 《巴拉伊塔》 本身。先生说：人若对同伴说「你去，摘些无花果自己吃」——这话是就哪一样情形说的呢？是就那树主是 地之民 的一样。树主若是 谨守之人，那摘的人尽可吃，不必分什一：这是 拉比犹大·哈纳西 的话。
上头那条 《巴拉伊塔》 里有几处费解之处。
The previous baraita contained several puzzling elements.
革玛拉 既议完了主题、就是「受托的人必办成所受之托」那一条，如今就来议那条 《巴拉伊塔》 本身。
Now that the Gemara has completed its primary discussion, namely the presumption that an agent carries out his mission, it turns to a discussion of the baraita itself.
先生说：人若对同伴说「你去，摘些无花果自己吃」——这话是就哪一样情形说的呢？
The Master said: If one said to his fellow: Go and gather for yourself figs, in what case is this statement said?
是就那树主是 地之民 的一样。
It is in a case where the owner of the fig tree is an am ha’aretz.
树主若是 谨守之人，那摘的人尽可吃，不必分什一：这是 拉比犹大·哈纳西 的话。
However, if he is a ḥaver, the gatherer may eat the figs, and he need not tithe them; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
革玛拉 问：这位 地之民 对同伴说话，他是对谁说的呢？你若说他是对另一个 地之民 说的，那么底下那一句「他须当 未净什一税食物 分什一」又怎么讲呢？地之民 岂肯听众贤者的告诫、疑同伙 地之民 的出产没有分过什一么？所以那必是说一个 地之民 叫一个 谨守之人 从他树上摘无花果，而那 谨守之人 断然是要分什一的。只是这条 《巴拉伊塔》 后半那一句「我的话看着比父亲的话更是」，说的却是：宁可疑 谨守之人 从不在近处的出产分取 举祭 与什一，也不可叫他们把 未分什一之物 给 地之民 吃。那里提 地之民 又是怎么讲呢？照那样讲，情形正相反。吃无花果的是 谨守之人，树主倒是 地之民。
革玛拉 问：这位 地之民 对同伴说话，他是对谁说的呢？
The Gemara asks: This am ha’aretz, who addressed his fellow man, to whom did he speak?
你若说他是对另一个 地之民 说的，那么底下那一句「他须当 未净什一税食物 分什一」又怎么讲呢？
If you say that he spoke to his fellow am ha’aretz, if so, how are we to understand the statement that follows: He must tithe them as demai?
地之民 岂肯听众贤者的告诫、疑同伙 地之民 的出产没有分过什一么？
Would an am ha’aretz comply with the admonition of the Sages to suspect that the produce of his fellow am ha’aretz may not have been tithed?
所以那必是说一个 地之民 叫一个 谨守之人 从他树上摘无花果，而那 谨守之人 断然是要分什一的。
Rather, this must be referring to an am ha’aretz who told a ḥaver to gather figs from his fig tree, and the ḥaver will certainly tithe them.
只是这条 《巴拉伊塔》 后半那一句「我的话看着比父亲的话更是」，说的却是：宁可疑 谨守之人 从不在近处的出产分取 举祭 与什一，也不可叫他们把 未分什一之物 给 地之民 吃。
However, say that the latter clause of this baraita: My statement appears to be more correct than Father’s statement, means the following: It is better that ḥaverim should be suspected of separating teruma and tithes from produce that is not adjacent to the produce they seek to exempt, and they should not feed amei ha’aretz produce that is tevel.
那里提 地之民 又是怎么讲呢？
What is the relevance of amei ha’aretz there?
照那样讲，情形正相反。
According to that explanation, the situation is the opposite.
吃无花果的是 谨守之人，树主倒是 地之民。
The person eating the figs is a ḥaver, and the owner of the fig tree is an am ha’aretz.
拉维纳 说：前一句说的是一个 地之民 对一个 谨守之人 说话，后一句说的是一个 谨守之人 对一个 地之民 说话，而另一个 谨守之人 在旁听见了；所议的不是那摘无花果的人，乃是那第二个 谨守之人 若有人把那无花果递给他，他可否吃。革玛拉 照这个讲法说明两下所争的：拉比犹大·哈纳西——
拉维纳 说：前一句说的是一个 地之民 对一个 谨守之人 说话，后一句说的是一个 谨守之人 对一个 地之民 说话，而另一个 谨守之人 在旁听见了；所议的不是那摘无花果的人，乃是那第二个 谨守之人 若有人把那无花果递给他，他可否吃。
Ravina said: The first clause is referring to an am ha’aretz who spoke to a ḥaver, while the latter clause is referring to a ḥaver who spoke to an am ha’aretz, and a different ḥaver heard him speak, and the discussion relates not to the one gathering the figs but to whether the second ḥaver may partake of the figs if they are offered to him.
革玛拉 照这个讲法说明两下所争的：拉比犹大·哈纳西——
The Gemara explains the disagreement according to this understanding: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi